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virginia Tort Reform: A Case of Crying Wolf? 
By 
Michael F. McAu1iffe* 
Introduction 
The current debate on tort reform has resu1 ted in 
ever-increasing cries of blame from all participants. As the 
factions become entangled in a battle of emotion, semantics and 
misrepresentation, the discussion of affordable, available 
liability insurance seems neglected at best, cast aside at worst. 
While several thoughtful studies have emerged, 1 the 
relationship between liability insurance and tort reform is often 
tenuously connected by anecdotal recitals that lack depth and 
sUbstance. 2 A systematic approach is needed to provide a forum 
for rational debate and evaluation. This article proposes a 
framework for the analysis of the recent tort reform action taken 
by the 1987 Virginia General Assemb1y.3 The article, using the 
reform legislation as a guide, evaluates the relevant tort 
variaJ;>les within th,e proposed framework. The article concludes by 
* Mr. McAuliffe is a 1st year law student at Marshall-Wythe School 
of Law, College of William and Mary and a Research Associate at 
the National Center for state Courts. The author wishes to thank 
Professor Paul LeBel and Dr. Robert Roper for their assistance and 
ideas relevant to this article. 
1 The Liability Crisis: Hearings Before The Subcommittee on 
Economic Stabilization of The Committee on Banking, Finance and 
Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, 
Second Session, Serial 99-98. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1986. Parts I and II. (hereinafter Hearings). 
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know 
and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our AllegedlY 
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4 (1983). 
Roper, The propensity to Litigate in state Trial Courts, 1981-
1985, 1984-1985, 11 Just. Sys. J. ___ (1987). 
A Call For Insurance Reform and Meaningful Insurance Regulation: 
Breaking the Cash-flow Underwriting cycle To Restore Equity In The 
Insurance Marketplace, submitted to the West Virginia Legislature 
by West Virginia Attorney General Charles Brown (1987) 
(hereinafter Brown Report) . 
2 See The Lawsuit Crisis, Insurance Information Institute, New 
York, April 1986; Sorry your Policy is Cancelled, Time, March 2, 
1986; Wall Street Journal, May 16, 1986 at 1, col.l.; Sky high 
Damage Suits, U.s. News and World Report, January 27, 1986 at 35. 
3 The Legislation includes: 1987 Va. Acts SB402, 
1987 Va. Acts SB404, 1987 Va. Acts SB405, 1987 Va. Acts SB407, 
1987 Va. Acts SB408, 1987 Va. Acts SB409, 1987 Va. Acts SB665, 
1987 Va. Acts HB1216, 1987 Va. Acts HB1315, 1987 Va. Acts SB618, 
1987 Va. Acts HB1234, 1987 Va. Acts HB1235. 
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suggesting appropriate future action concerning tort reform and 
the insurance crisis in Virginia. 
Framework for Discussion: A Two-Part Analysis 
No established structure exists in which tort reform and its 
relationship to the present insurance situation can be uniformly 
addressed. The discussion is too often framed in conclusions. 
Popular periodical articles unquestioningly assume a litigation 
explosion is occurring. 4 A recent Justice Department Tort Policy 
Report confidently concludes that federal product liability 
filings have increased 758 percent from 1974-1985 and, by 
implication, state filings have also increased significantly. 5 
This is despite the fact that 95-97 percent of all tort cases are 
filed in the state court system. 6 
The conclusory methods of many in regard to the complex 
insurance liability crisis cloud the discussion of critical causal 
variables. The relevant variables encompass both insurance related 
and tort related issues. The tort related variables include (1) 
the level of litigation, (2) the size and frequency of tort 
awards, (3) sUbstantive tort law and (4) court review 
mechanisms. These variables are not meant to be exhaustive, but 
represent a limited set of visible factors commonly used as 
correlates of the insurance liability crisis. 7 The proper 
framework for the discussion of tort reform consists of a two-part 
analysis. The tort variables should be (1) addressed in principle 
and (2) subsequently quantified. The discussion of the tort 
variables in principle focuses on the logical foundation that 
links the variables to the insurance crisis. Further, the 
purported net effect of the tort variables, insurance losses, 
should be examined in addition to measuring the variables 
themselves as part of the quantification discussion. 
4 See supra, note 2. 
5 Tort Policy Working Group, Report of the Tort Policy Working 
Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current 
crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability, 45 (1986) 
(hereinafter Tort Policy Working Group Report). The report simply 
asserts, "There is no reason to believe that the state courts have 
not witnessed a similar dramatic increase in the number of product 
liability claims." 
6 Roper, State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual Report 1984, 
5 
A systematic method of evaluating tort reform variables 
enables the analysis to remain focused. Thus, the methodology of 
this article provides the framework to discuss the relationship of 
the tort variables to the present liability insurance crisis and 
then examine their impact on the liability "landscape." 
The Known "Crisis" 
That an insurance rate crisis exists throughout the nation is 
not disputed. In Virginia, rates in several lines (including 
medical malpractice and day care) have experienced 100 to 300+ 
percent increases in premiums in the past two years. 8 In 
obstetrics, Virginia insurers at one point stopped writing 
policies altogether. 9 The areas most affected by the current 
insurance crisis are medical malpractice, small businesses (day 
care, manufacturing) and corporate directors and officers. The 
lack of affordable, available liability insurance has rocked the 
foundation of predictability that Virginia businesses, 
municipalities and professionals rely on to operate. The self-
evident truth is that liability insurance is an economic necessity 
and the lack of that necessity has provided the catalyst for a 
quick-fix approach. 
Nationally, the liability premium situation is much the same 
as in Virginia. Rates have risen drastically in many liability 
lines since 1984. 10 In west Virginia, five leading insurers, in 
one sweep, cancelled coverage for over 6,500 health care 
insureds .11 Notably, Virginia and the nation endured a similar 
rate crisis during 1975-1977 when rates rose and coverage 
availability was restricted. 12 Seven to ten year insurance 
business cycles have emerged that possess the same 
National Center for State Courts (1986). 
7 Tort Policy Working Group Report, s~pra note 5, at 34. 
8 virginia Attorney General's Submiss~on, Joint Subcommittee 
studying the Liability Insurance Crisis and the Need For Tort 
Reform, Senate Document No. 11 Richmond, virginia: The 
Commonwealth of Virginia (1987) at Appendix D (Hereinafter Senate 
Document No. 11). 
9 The companies were st. Paul's and the Virginia Insurance 
Reciprocal. Id. at 13. 
10 For example, premiums for corporate directors and officers 
rose 50 to 500 percent in 1985 nationally. Tort Policy Working 
Group Report, iupra note 5, at 6. 
II The West V rginia Attorney General subsequently filed suit in 
federal court seeking an injunction prohibiting the insurers from 
cancelling their policies. Brown Report, supra note 1, at 21. 
6 
characteristics at the bottom of each cycle: liability rates 
dramatically increasing, availability of liability coverage being 
severely restricted, frequent policy cancellations and a cry for 
change. 13 The cry for change in 1985-87 has been answered by 
well-intentioned but erroneous legislation: tort reform. 
The 1987 General Assembly 
Virginia joined the majority of state legislatures in 1987 
in passing legislation aimed at alleviating the extreme and 
recurring liability insurance crisis. The new tort legislation 
includes14 
1. Senate Bill eSB) 402: A cap on punitive damages at 
$350,000. 
2. SB 404: Liability limit~tions for corporate 
officers and directors. 
3. SB 405: Modifies the statute of limitations for minors 
who suffer birth injuries. 
4. SB 407: Sanctions against the filing of frivolous 
claims or pleadings. 
5. SB 408: Liability protection for persons who 
are involved in emergency obstetrical care when 
the mother's medical records are unavailable and 
the personnel did not supervise prenatal care. 
6. SB 409: Limited liability immunity for members of local 
government entities. 
7. SB 665: Compensation fund for victims suffering 
injuries from vaccinations. Payment from the fund 
precludes tort recovery from the doctor and/or 
manufacturer. 
8. House Bill eHB) 1216: A special recovery fund for 
children who suffer brain or spinal injuries during 
birth. The fund precludes recovery through the courts. 
9. HB 1315: Allows cities, towns or other political 
subdivisions to provide its employees and volunteers 
including local governments, commissions, boards and 
agencies with liability insurance coverage. 
The session also produced three significant insurance measures. 
1. SB 618: A fund to provide medical malpractice insurance 
when it is otherwise unavailable is restructured to 
lower rates for participating doctors. 
2. HB 1234: A yearly filing requirement that details the 
type of payment (claim, settlement) and how much loss 
reserve is set aside by each insurer. Modeled after 
current medical malpractice reporting. 
3. HB 1235: Requires at least 45 day notice of policy 
cancellations, reductions or significant rate 
increases. Also allows Bureau of Insurance to consider 
investment income in the determination of unfair rates. 
The 1986 General Assembly appointed a joint subcommittee to 
study the liability crisis and the need for tort reform, and to 
report its findings to the 1987 General Assembly. The newly passed 
12 Senate Document No. 11, supra note 9, at 5. 
13 Id. 
14 Bill references were found in Summary of the Regular 1987 
Legislative Session of the virginia General Assembly, prepared by 
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tort legislation is, in part, a reflection of the subcommittee's 
recommendations. 15 Virginia Attorney General Mary Sue Terry also 
submitted recommended legislation that focused on the problems of 
the state's insurance regulatory scheme. 16 The enacted 
legislation relevant to insurance reform reveals the Attorney 
General's position that the insurance industry is largely 
responsible for the present insurance crisis. 
The tort reform legislation passed by the General Assembly 
also reflects the intense political maneuvering that often 
accompanies tort reform. As a example, SB 402, the punitive 
damages cap bill, started in the Senate as a cap on damages for 
"pain and suffering" (a form of non-economic damages). The House 
responded by changing the bill to punitive damages and forced a 
last minute compromise. 17 
The change to a punitive damages cap was a victory for tort 
reform opponents because they viewed the cap on pain and suffering 
to be more intrusive to the rights of injured victims. However, 
the result of such distinct special interest lobbying is that the 
debate is missing the basic cooperation that is needed to find 
real causes and effective solutions to the liability crisis. 
Despite the factional nature of the participants, the clear 
goal of .the lawmakers in enacting the reforms was to reduce and 
stabilize insurance rates and to increase liability policy 
availability. The Virginia legislation reveals a well-worn 
emphasis on altering legal mechanisms and limiting court access in 
tort recovery to accomplish those goals. Senate Bills 404, 405, 
407, 408, 409, 665, and House Bill 1216 all attempt to limit the 
"input" (disputes) of the legal system. Simultaneously, Senate 
Bill 402 limits the "output" (damages) of the legal system. 
The Virginia legislation was passed in the belief that 
decreased use of the legal system will help "solve" the 
liability insurance crisis. The assumption that tort reform is 
the answer to the insurance crisis persists in the minds of 
the Division of Legislative Service (1987). 
15 Senate Document No. 11, supra, note 9. 
16 Senate Document No. 11, supra note 9 at Attorney General's 
Office submission. 
17 Insurance Damage Limits Clear House, Times-Herald, 
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lawmakers and the public. 18 If incorrect, these pervasive views 
on the tort system will misdirect much of the reform "mentality" 
that exists and will result in Virginia and the nation repeating 
the present insurance crisis experience. 
The Framework Applied to Tort Reform 
The Validity of the Variables 
Placed under scrutiny, the selected tort variables provide a 
basic picture of how the tort system in reality affects the 
present liability insurance crisis. Tort reform advocates assert 
that (1) the increase in the level of litigation and (2) the lack 
of realistic damage assessment (specifically, the standards used 
in non-economic and punitive damage determinations) act in 
concert to remove stability in the rate-making process. 19 
Additionally, reform advocates claim that the size and frequency 
of jury awards result in high claim (loss) payments, thus 
eliminating insurance profitability. Both ass.:!rtions combine to 
make the financial state of the insurers the nexus between the 
tort system and the insurance crisis, thus the discussion in this 
article reflects that emphasis. 
The Level of Litigation 
Numerous articles confidently conclude that the frequency of 
tort claims is a primary source of the current high insurance 
rates. 20 Although the level of tort litigation may affect the 
cost structure of the insurance industry (ultimately seen in 
policy rates), the reverse conclusion, that because there are high 
insurance rates then there are necessarily high levels of 
litigation, does not follow. Simply, one cannot state a 
February 27, 1987 at B4, col. 1. 
18 See Lawpoll, A.B.A. J. Vol. 73 at 37 (1987): Public Attitudes 
Toward The Civil Justice System And Tort Law Reform, Survey by 
Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. for Aetna. Note, the results of 
the poll are somewhat inconsistent. For example, the poll 
indicates that a majority of respondents thought the present tort 
system is fair to both plaintiff and defendant. At the same time, 
the poll also indicated that the majority of respondents thought 
that plaintiffs were recovering excessive awards and the tort 
system needed reform. 
19 Tort Policy Working Group Report, supra note 5, at 30. 
20 See supra note 2: Hearings, supra note 1, at 144 (testimony of 
Richard Willard, Assistant u.S. Attorney General). 
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conclusion and claim that the conclusion alone justifies the 
premise. 
The relationship between insurance rates and litigation 
levels is inherently more complex. Indeed, a given level of 
litigation does not translate into a given level of claim payouts 
(that would depend on individual dispute outcomes). Even if more 
claims are being litigated, plaintiffs might be losing. Further, 
even if the level of litigation is increasing, the qualitative 
judgement that the increase is unwarranted is speculative at best. 
The assumption that the recovery rate of ten or twenty years ago 
is the optimum level of litigation is an unsupported fallacy of 
opinion. 
A recent research study of long-term civil filings in Arizona 
suggests that civil filings are cyclical and tied to economic 
conditions. 21 The implication of such findings is that the level 
of litigation itself is not an accurate measure of the general 
incentive to litigate, but may reflect other external factors 
outside the control of the tort system. For example, landlord-
tenant disputes might increase because landlords may have to seek 
enforced remedies (e.g. back rent) that in better economic 
conditions would not be as necessary because of replacement 
tenants. 
In addition, the majority of disputes (in civil litigation 
generally and specifically with tort claims) never reach formal 
litigation. 22 A significant portion of claims are settled with 
alternative dispute resolution methods. 23 Thus, while litigation 
levels change, a corresponding change (inverse or direct) may 
occur with settlements. The relationship between litigation and 
alternative dispute resolution is presently unclear, but any link 
21 Stookey, Economic Cycles and Civil Litigation, 
11 Just. Sys. J. (1987). 
22 90-95 percent-of all disputes are resolved before trial. 
Trends in Million Dollar Verdicts, A.B.A. J. Vol. 70 at 54 
(1984) . 
23 63 percent of civil cases are settled, and less than 10 
percent are tried through verdict. Kritzer. The Lawyer as 
Negotiator: working in the Shadows, Paper presented at the 
Conference on Frontiers of Research on Civil Litigation, Institute 
of Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin Law SI::hool, 
September 20, 1985 at 12. (cited in Assault on Personal Injury 
Lawsuits: A Study of Reality versus Myths, Public Citizen, (1986) 
(hereinafter Public Citizen Report). 
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severely limits the theoretical accuracy of the "litigation 
explosion" argument as evidence of severe insurance losses. 
However, a sustained and dramatic increase in the number of 
tort cases could conceiveably act as a rough indicator of a system 
out of balance. The next question, given some "conceivable" 
relationship between the level of litigation and insurance loss 
payments, is whether the nation's courts are suffering the burden 
of increased filings. 
The body of evidence is growing that shows no significant, 
disproportionate increases in tort filings. The National center 
for state Courts' (NCSC) study of civil tort filings for 1978 
through 1984 reveals a 9 percent increase in tort filings matched 
with an 8 percent increase in population. 24 In the 1985 update of 
the tort filings study, the National center for state Courts found 
an irregular checkerboard pattern. The study concludes: 
Although, the same patterns exist among the states, 
i.e. some are experiencing increases, some 
decreases, and others no significant changes, the 
general downward trend appears to have abated •. tort 
filings did not increase at all in New Jersey's 
general jurisdiction courts; increased between 1 and 
4 percent in four other state courts; increased 5-8 
percent in the general jurisdiction courts of five 
states; rose by at least 10 percent in five states; 
but were down in another five statewide general 
jurisdiction courts. 25 
Importantly, no study of national scope that uses relatively 
comprehensive data has surfaced contradicting the NCSC's 
findings. 26 Notably, Virginia Supreme Court Chief Justice Harry 
Carrico recently testified before Congress: 
There is a widely held belief that our society is becoming 
ever more litigious, that we are far too willing to sue 
for damages and punitive awards. We have not experienced 
this explosion in virginia ••• A new study by the National 
Center for State Courts has informed us .•• that we are not 
all that different (from the rest of the nation).27 
24 A Preliminary Examination of Available Civil and Criminal 
Trend Data in state Trial Courts for 1978, 1981 and 1984, National 
Center for State Courts, (1986). 
25Roper, supra note 1, at ___ . 
26 See, Peterson, Civil Juries in the 1980's, Trends in Jury 
Trials and Verdicts in California and Cook County, Illinois, 
Rand Institute of civil Justice (1987). The Rand study, though 
limited to San Francisco and Cook counties, revealed significant 
differences in litigation levels between the two sites. The 
results fail to quantify any consistent litigation trend and 
explicitly note the median jury awards in both sites are not 
indicative of an award explosion. 
27 Statement of the Conference of Chief Justices on Amendments to 
S.1999 and S.100 before the Consumer Subcommittee Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate, May 20, 1986. 
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The objective determination that no tort litigation 
"explosion" exists in the nation's courts seems beyond serious 
contention. However, the perception of an increase in the level of 
litigation persists, in part due to the media coverage of the tort 
reform debate and an easily identifiable culprit (the legal 
system) .28 Some have correctly asserted that tort filings may 
eventually increase, not because of the tort variables, but 
because of the media. 29 The image of large verdicts and high 
levels of litigation may become a media induced, self-fulfilling 
prophecy. The risk is present that the media will provide 
unjustified reinforcement for the current attitudes of a failing 
tort system and ill-founded and misplaced reform will result. 
Jury Awards 
Possibly more relevant to insural1ce industry financial 
performance than general litigation level data is the size and 
frequency of jury awards broken down by specific types of cases. 
Tort reform advocates argue that the tort system unnecessarily 
allows excessive jury awards (specifically, non-economic and 
punitive damages). The foundation of the pro-reform argument is 
that plaintiffs lj:- ;ate because of the built-in probability of 
over-recovery. The result is that insurers incur excessive 
payments which in_,lrn fuels the liability insurance crisis. 
The primary tort law indicators relevant to Virginia's 
legislation are non-economic and punitive damages. In principle, 
the concept of non-economic damages is in accordance with accepted 
notions of just compensation. However, if jury awards are not 
based on adequate proof, the probability of excessive awards 
increases. This concern is the rationale for legislative caps on 
damage awards similar to Virginia's SB 402. As of late 1986, 
twenty-five states had enacted some type of damage award 
limitation. 30 
28 Roper, supra note 1, at 
29 Id. at 
30 Figure is compiled from the following sources: National 
Conference of State Legislatures, summary Report of 1986 
Legislative Action_on Liability Insurance, (1986); 
Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks 
on Medical Malpractice Laws, 38 Okla. L. Rev. 195 (1985); Klein. 
Caps in the Hat: Legislative Lids on Runaway Verdicts, 28 For The 
Def. 19 (1986). Note, damage award caps have been the subject of 
12 
The subjective nature of non-economic damages, however, does 
not translate into a flawed tort system. Jury awards are subject 
to the review of the court through remittitur and the appellate 
process. Notably, the most common "war stories" cited by tort 
reform advocates concern excessive awards. The same cases also 
represent the most appropriate examples of a system capable of 
correcting itself. 31 
Punitive damages have similar inherently subjective standards. 
However, unlike non-economic damages, punitive damages are 
fashioned to punish the defendant for actions deemed committed 
wi th unacceptable intent. Virginia courts use malice or 
recklessness with conscious disregard of others as the standard of 
conduct. 32 As with non-economic damages, the court can review 
the appropriateness of punitive damages and intervene when 
necessary. Thus, the quantifiable question is whether, despite 
the current court mechanisms, the frequency and size of non-
economic and punitive awards are significantly affecting insurance 
performance. 
The sources of data most commonly cited concerning jury 
awards lack the depth and methodology of the litigation studies. 
The major organization currently used by both sides in the tort 
debate is Jury Verdict Research, Inc. (JVR). 33 The manner in 
which the data is packaged seems to dictate which side uses the 
(JVR) verdict information. Tort reform advocates point to the 
"average" award in tort cases (specifically medical malpractice) 
to show a whole system gone wild. 
For example, the Justice Department Tort Policy Working Group 
Report points to an average medical malpractice jury award of 
$666,123 in 1984. 34 However, the median award is a more suitable 
figure to indicate a "representative" award because the presence 
of extremely large awards will skew the average jury award. 
recent constitutional litigation. Recently, Boyd v. Bulala, 
647 F. Supp. 781 (W.O. Va. 1986), invalidated the current medical 
malpractice award cap of 1 million dollars on federal 
constitutional grounds. The state plans to appeal the case. 
31Roper, supr~ note 1, at ___ • 
32 Giant of V1rginia v. Pigg, 207 Va. 679. 
33 See Jury Verdict Research, Inc. Injury Valuation: Current 
Award Trends, No. 304 (1986) (cited in Tort Policy Working Group 
Report, supra note 5, at 35-45). 
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Importantly, JVR expressly notes that median awards are the 
applicable figure when discussing "representative" jury 
awards. 35 The median medical malpractice award for 1984 was 
$200,000. 36 Generally, when median awards are used, no dramatic 
increase in the size of awards is shown for any tort case type. 37 
However, the data used and methodology employed by JVR limits 
its use. For example, only successful recoveries are computed into 
the statistical award figures published by JVR, when all verdicts 
should be included to accurately reflect jury determinations. 
Also, only original verdicts are included in the figures. A 
significant portion of verdicts are reduced, rendering verdict 
figures inaccurate when used in the context of measuring insurance 
payouts. A recent study tracking the final payout of the million 
dollar verdicts reported by JVR, reports the total value of the 
verdict awards was reduced by 57 percent. 38 The study also showed 
that higher verdict amounts experienced the largest reductions and 
the most seriously injured received the largest net 
recovery. 39 These relationships point not to a system out of 
control, but to a court system capable of rational review and 
adjustment. 
The fundamental problems with JVR verdict figures limit their 
utility in the tort reform debate and provide the incentive for 
alternative sources of information to be developed. One recent 
study of civil jury verdicts in 43 counties in 10 states concluded 
(1) verdicts fell into fairly defined moderate ranges and (2) no 
significant pattern of short-term increases in verdict awards 
exists in the sampled courts. 40 The study is not meant to be 
nationally representative, but does provide the most useful 
34 Tort Policy Working Group Report, supra note 5, at 35-36. 
35 Hearings, supra note 1, at 171 (testimony of Philip J. Herman, 
Jury Verdict Research, Inc.). 
36 See, supra note 23, at 19. 
37 Id. at 18-19. 
38 Broder, Characteristics of Million Dollar Awards: Jury 
Verdicts and Final Disbursements, 11 Just. Sys. J. ___ (1987). 
39 Id. at • 
40 Daniels and Martin, Jury Verdicts and the "Crisis" in civil 
Justice: Some Findings from an Empirical Study, 
11 Just. Sys. J. ___ (1987). The study states, "The interquartile 
ranges are also modest for most sites. The 75th percentile is 
below $100,000 in 26 sites, and the interquartile range itself 
(from the 25th to 75th percentile) is less than $100,000 in almost 
two-thirds (28) of the sites, indicating that most awards fall 
14 
methodology and data on jury awards to date and should provide the 
basis for subsequent work. 
Another recent study, limited to punitive damages, has 
concluded that the evidence indicates extremely limited use of 
punitive damages by the nation's courts. 4l specifically, the 
study indicates punitive damages were awarded in less than 2 
percent of sampled product liability cases in 1984-1985. 42 
When award figures are properly scrutinized, the findings 
suggest that (1) the jury system is not awarding excessive damages 
and (2) when large awards are given, the present court mechanisms 
often reduce the amounts substantially. 
Insurance Industry Financial Performance 
The tort variables are only relevant to the insurance crisis 
to the extent that they affect insurance industry finanical 
performance. Therefore, if the industry is financially sound, the 
causal "impact" of the tort variables would be minimal. One can 
argue that despite a hypothetically high level of litigation and 
high jury awards, if the industry is profitable, the need to 
dramatically increase liability premiums would still be missing. 
The evidence concerning insurance industry performance is a 
central point of disagreement between tort reform advocates and 
tort system supporters. The insurance industry (a tort reform 
advocate) uses statutory accounting methods to show financial 
performance, while others (insurance reform advocates, tort system 
supporters, and most industries other than the insurance industry) 
use Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to measure 
financial performance. 
The weight of recent scholarly literature suggests GAAP more 
realistically reflects the operating performance and financial 
state of the insurance industry. 43 Using the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles method, the industry has experienced a net 
gain of $83 billion dollars over the last ten years. 44 Further, 
within a well-defined and relatively narrow range." 
41 Landes and Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages, 
10 Reg. 33 (1986). 
42 Id. at 36. 
43 Brown Report, supra note I, at 6. 
44 Hearings, supra note I, at 4 (prepared statement of William 
Anderson, General Government Division, united states General 
15 
the value of insurance industry stock doubled in 1985. 45 Indeed, 
the industry, in its worst year, 1984, reported a profit. 46 
In virginia, the industry has, on average, lower payout rates 
than the rest of the nation and recently has experienced a 37 
percent annual rate of return. 47 Appropriately, the insurance 
reform measures, HB 1314 and 1315, allow (but do not require) 
state regulators to look at the industry's performance in Virginia 
(including investment income) when determining if Virginia rates 
are excessive. 
The insurance industry is not suffering from deep, 
permanent organizational financial losses. While certain lines of 
insurance coverage may be experiencing losses, the evidence 
indicates that the insurance industry as a whole is performing 
profitably and in relative ignorance of the "runaway tort system" 
given the role of wolf. 
Virginia's Response to the Variables 
The Virginia General Assembly's response to the current 
insurance crisis is a legislative package of tort reform and a 
fleeting attempt at insurance rate oversight. The continuing 
adherence to quick, almost reflexive actions exemplifies the lack 
of depth taken by many lawmakers when confronted with insurance 
industry cries of abuse and instability. For example, the joint 
subcommittee report concludes that (1) punitive damages are not 
being excessively awarded, (2) a stable loss environment 
exists in Virginia for insurers, (3) no litigation "explosion" is 
present in Virginia and (4) the insurance industry is 
profitable. 48 
Despite these findings, the report recommends tort reform 
legislation to achieve a "balance" of interests between consumers, 
insurers and inj ured persons. 49 However, the interests that tort 
reform addresses (e.g. injured persons' recoveries, insurance 
Accounting Office). 
45 Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (testimony 'of J. Robert Hunter, 
National Insurance Consumer Organization). 
46 Id. at attachment II (General Accounting Office statement). 
47 senate Document No. 11, supra note 9, at Appendix C (and 
insurance performance report of the Virginia Attorney General's 
Office consultant). 
48 Senate Document No. 11, supra note 8, at 8-10. 
49 Id. at 11. 
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losses through recovery payments and loss predictions based on 
levels of litigation) are the very issues identified in the report 
as being "in balance." The only relevant variable not "in balance" 
is the insurance rates presently forced on consumers. 
The current Virginia tort legislation fails, not because the 
lawmakers' goal of reducing insurance rates is inappropriate, but 
because the focus on accomplishing the rate reduction is 
misplaced. Given the empirical evidence of no litigation 
explosion, no serious award abuse and a profitable insurance 
industry, the continuing attention on 'tort reform is 
unwarranted and, in the context of finding solutions to the 
liability insurance crisis, simply wrong. 
Alternative Variables 
The level of tort litigation and size of damage awards are but 
two of a set of factors that potentially affect the financial 
performance of the insurance industry. with the elimination of the 
tort variables as primary causal elements, the insurance oriented 
variables (cash-flow underwriting, cyclicality of the industry, 
poor risk assessment etc.) offer a sound alternative explanation 
for the present insurance rate crisis. 
While an in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this 
article, recent literature50 suggests that the insurance industry 
underpriced and accepted riskier policies during the period of 
high interest rates (1981-1983). Using this myopic strategy, the 
companies attracted large amounts of investment capital. The high 
rates of return on investment income during this period shielded 
the industry from any purely premium/payout based losses. Indeed, 
the industry more than covered any incidental premium/payout 
10sses. 51 In addition, reinsurers bought the riskier policies 
from the primary insurers and the process continued. 
Only when interest rates fell in 1984 did insurers have to 
cover the decreased income from investments and pure 
50 Brown Report, supra note 1; Hearings, supra note 1 (testimony 
of insurance industry executives and representatives in Part II); 
McGee, The Cycle in Property/casualty Insurance, FRBNY Quarterly 
Review 22 (Autumn, 1986). 
51 Hearings, supra note 1, at 4-6 (of the General Accounting 
Office Report). 
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premium/payout losses with drastically increased premiums. 
Simultaneously, reinsurers stopped buying the riskier policies and 
the whole market contracted. Based on the foregoing explanation, 
many conclude that the insurance business cycle is the primary 
causal agent afflicting the insurance industry. 
Conclusion 
A two part analysis of the tort variables asserts a 
persuasive case for the elimination of the level of litigation and 
jury awards as causal elements in the present insurance crisis. 
Indeed, the analysis reveals a tort system operating with no 
national litigation trends and to a court system capable of 
self correcting any propensity to award excessive damages. 
Any future action concerning Virginia's insurance problem 
should focus on insurance reform, not tort reform. specifically, 
the virginia Board of Insurance should promote stability through 
better analysis of the industry's financial performance, more 
control on fluctuations in rates and an authoritative role in the 
determination of the rates themselves. 52 
Tort reform in Virginia should be separated from the present 
liability insurance crisis and evaluated using independent 
theories of justification. For example, Virginia might address the 
role of contributory negligence and whether it provides adequate 
opportunity for just compensation. 53 Another related 
consideration would be whether, under an alternative (comparative) 
negligence scheme, joint and several liability would remain a 
viable doctrine. virginia tort reform represents ample debatable 
issues without the unnecessary and unwarranted linkage to the 
state's liability insurance crisis. 
An independent evaluation of the tort system and concurrent 
investigation of insurance reform eliminates many of the 
predetermined conclusions presently hampering the insurance 
liability discussion, and may encourage reasoned, thoughtful 
change in both areas. 
52 Senate Document No. 11, supra, note 9, at Attorney General's 
Office legislative recommendations. 
53 LeBel, contributory Negligence and Mitigation of Damages: 
Comparative Negligence Through the Back Door? 10 Va. B. A. J. 11 
(1984). 
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VIRGINIA • S STA'l'O'l'ORY CAP ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AWARDS: 
A Message to the General Assembly to Tighten the Lid 
By 
Richard T. Pledger* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the mid-1970's, the American medical community has 
experienced greater and greater difficulty securing affordable 
malpractice insurance coverage. What began as a bona fide attempt to 
extend coverage at reasonable rates has rapidly evolved into an 
expensive, high stakes business venture. Doctors at one time paid 
nominal premiums to protect themselves from potential yet unlikely 
claims. Today, most physicians spend enormous sums just to obtain 
minimal coverage. For others, adequate coverage is simply unavailable. 
As a result, most health care providers must make the difficult 
decision of paying outrageous premiums, practicing without liability 
insurance, or leaving the profession altogether. l The alternatives 
are unacceptable. In short, there seems to be a malpractice insurance 
crisis, at least on a national scale. 
Although premiums are rising for a number of bona fide economic 
reasons, a much more fundamental and troubling phenomenon is at work. 
Malpractice claims currently are adjudicated by a method that permits 
damage awards that are grossly disproportionate to actual injuries 
incurred. At common law, awards traditionally encompassed the whole 
gamut of compensatory and exemplary damages. Moreover, because the 
plaintiffs' bar has routinely operated on a thirty-three percent 
contingency fee basis, prayers and awards for relief have often been 
grossly exaggerated. Although there is some degree of precision in 
measuring actual damages, such measurement remains highly subjective. 
The ability of claimants to secure disproportionately large settlement 
agreements also is enhanced by this process. For these reasons, 
insurance carriers must raise their premiums lest they go bankrupt, 
leaving truly meritorious claimants uncompensated. 
In response to this perceived insurance crisis, many state 
legislatures took steps to modify the procedural and substantive 
aspects of medical malpractice law.2 In addition, various changes 
were made and implemented in state insurance laws.3 Some of the 
advances have been successfuli 4 others have been struck by subsequent 
judicial review on various constitutional grounds.5 
* Mr. Pledger is a 3d year law student at the Marshall-Wythe School 
of Law and Chief Justice of the Moot Court Board. 
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VIRGINIA' S S'l'AWl'ORY CAP 
The Commonwealth of Virginia has followed the trend of most other 
states. The General Assembly enacted the Medical Malpractic Act of 
virginia,6 an elaborate statutory scheme providing for medical 
malpractice review panels, as well as other sUbstantive and procedural 
changes. Aside from some adverse commentary,7 Virginia's prescreening 
process has been perceived as largely successful. Much more 
controversial, however, has been the statutory cap placed on medical 
malpractice awards by section 8.0l-S8l.lS.8 
Section 8.0l-S8l.lS provides that n[i]n any verdict returned 
against a health care provider in an action for malpractice ••• the 
total amount recoverable for any injury to, or death of, a patient 
shall not exceed one million dollars.n9 The effect of this provision 
is to preclude recovery of all damages, compensatory as well as 
exemplary, which exceed one million dollars, regardless of the 
severity of the injury. Like many other states' statutory cap 
provisions, the Act's legislative findings were stated in broo.d terms. 
However, they were specific enough to echo the general concerns 
expressed nationwide during the mid-1970s.10 
Response to the statutory cap was strong and poignant. One 
particularly adept article,ll authored by Edward Taylor and William 
Shields, thoroughly explores the history of the Act, Virginia's 
experience prior to the cap's enactment, and some of the more salient 
constitutional questions that the Act posed. The article specifically 
asserts that, contrary to the findings of the General Assembly, 
n[t]here was no demonstrated need for legislation in 1976 which 
limi ted recovery for malpractice. n12 The article urges n [c) ourts [to] 
declare the cap violative of the Constitution of .Virginia [and] apply 
a 'means focused' test to find it unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.nl3 The concerns 
expressed by Taylor and Shields have recently been addressed by two 
courts sitting in Virginia. 
The first case, Boyd ~ Bulala,14 was decided by Judge Michael of 
the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. 
In Boyd, the plaintiffs claimed that their child was born with various 
mental and physical handicaps as a result of their doctor's 
negligence. The jury agreed and returned verdicts for a total of $8.3 
million dollars. In its discussion of the constitutionality of the 
cap, the court refused to hold that it violated the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment.lS It did hold, however, that the 
cap impermissibly infringed the right to a jury trial under both the 
seventh amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, 
section 11 of the Virginia Constitution.16 
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In its equal protection analysis, the court found that the cap 
"creates neither a suspect classification nor infringes upon a 
fundamental right."17 Therefore, because the cap was nothing more 
than a classic example of economic regulation, the proper standard of 
review was the rational relation or nexus test. lS Under this 
standard, legislation is presumed constitutional and will be upheld if 
it is rationally related to the legislative objectives. The court 
simply found that "the medical malpractice cap is clearly a rational 
means to achieve the legislative goal of securing the provision of 
health care services by maintaining insurance at affordable rates."19 
Judge Michael then turned to the jury trial issue. The court 
recognized that the jury has traditionally performed an important 
function in the history and jurisprudence of both the United States 
and the Commonwealth of virginia.20 Part of its role is to serve as a 
fact-finding body, and" [s] ince the assessment of damages is a fact 
issue committed to the jury for resolution, a limitation on the 
performance of that function is a limitation on the role of the 
jury."2l Consequently, the cap imposed by section S.01-5Sl.15 was 
held to restrict the right to a jury trial, a violation of the seventh 
amendement to the United States Constitution.22 Similarily, in the 
courts view, because "article 1, secion 11 of the Virginia 
Constitution is ••• equivalent to the feoeral seventh amendment 
right," it held that the cap violated the Commonwealth's constitution 
as well.23 
The second case, Williams v. Van Der Woude,24 was decided by Judge 
Fortkort of the Ninet.eenth Judicial Circuit of Virginia. In Williams, 
the plaintiff claimed that the negligence of her ooctor and a local 
clinic led to the failure to diagnose and treat her cervical cancer. 
The jury agreed and returned a verdict in the amount of three million 
dollars. In considering the plaintiff's motion to waive the statutory 
cap, the court rejected Judge Michael's jury right and equal 
protection analyses in Boyd. Instead, Judge Fortkort declined to rule 
on the jury question at all and held that the statutory cap violated 
equal prot.ection under the federal constitution. 
The circuit court first addressed the argument that the cap 
violated the right to a jury trial. Alt.hough the court opined that 
the cap "imposes severe limitations on the Constitutional [sic] right 
to a jury trial," it expressly refrained from ruling on that point.25 
In a lengthy footnote, Judge Fortkort expressed reservations about the 
cap's constitutional invalidity in this regard and noted that "tbe 
[United States] Suprenle Court may not conclude that the limitation on 
the jury as a fact finder is a violation of the Seventh Amendment."26 
Although the court declined to rule on the jury issue, it did 
premise its equal protection analysis on the important function of the 
jury. The court explicitly found that the right to a jury trial is 
accorded greater protection under the Virginia Constitution than unoer 
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the federal constitution. nThe Virginia right to a jury trial,n wrote 
Judge Fortkort, nis more explicit than the Federal Constitutional 
[sic] grant and is a basic· right of our people. Since ••• the right 
to a civil jury trial is not deemed a fundamental right under [federal 
constitutional] analysis, it is at least an 'important' right [in 
Virginia] demanding 'heightened scrutiny,.n27 In support, the court 
cited article 1, section 11 of the Virginia Constitution which 
provides in part n[t]hat in controversies respecting property and in 
suits between man and man, trial by jury is preferable to any other, 
and ought to be held sacred.n28 
The court's selection of this rational basis with heightened 
scrutiny test was based on its interpretation of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center ,29 a recent case decided by the United States Supreme 
Court. In Cleburne, a city ordinance that required a special use 
permit be acquired prior to the opening of a group home for the 
mentally retarded was challenged and declared unconstitutional on 
equal protection grounds. Judge Fortkort found that, although nthe 
Cleburne decision was badly fragmentedn, it created a rational basis 
with heightened scrutiny standard which is more deferential than the 
intermediate scrutiny standard but less so that the rational basis 
test. 30 
In addition to finding that the right to a jury trial in Virginia 
is an important right worthy of heightened scrutiny, the court also 
found that the statutory cap discriminated against a particularly 
sensitive class. The cap places a one million dollar limit on all 
damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions. Although persons 
sustaining one million dollars or less in damages are entitled to full 
compensation under the statute, those who incur greater damages are 
not. Thus, the sensitive class nis comprised of those persons most 
seriously injured by the negligence of medical care providers.31 
In short, the court provides two reasons for adopting a rational 
basis with heightened scrutiny stanc1ard. First, the statute removes 
from the jury's consideration an assessment of damages above the cap's 
limit, a function traditionally assigned to the jury. Under the 
Virginia Constitution, the right to a jury trial is sacred and any 
curtailment of that right ought to receive heightened scrutiny. 
Second, the cap creates two classes amongst those injured by medical 
malpractice. One is enti t:l ed to receive full compensation, whereas 
the other is not. The dispositive question for the court, then, was 
whether the state had articulated legitimate objectives to justify the 
cap's enactment. At this juncture the court considered the 
legislative findings articulated in the Act's preamble. Judge 
Fortkort, citing the article by Taylor and Shields,32 found that 
n Ie] ontrClry to some representations made at the time the stCltllte was 
enrolled, there was no real malpractice insurance crisis in Virginia. 
There was no evidence that health care providers were declining to 
practice in Virginia due to high premiums.n33 The court further 
elaborated on tIle legitimacy of the state's objectives: 
" 
The number of cases involving the medical 
malpractice limitation may be fewer that 10 in the 
10 years of its existence. The limitation is 
indiscriminate in that it is a general limitation 
regardless of the injuries proven. The beneficiary 
of the limitation has not been the general public 
since the size of the affected group is too small 
to have any effect on general insurance premiums. 
Plainly stated, the beneficiaries of the 
limitation are those who have committed a civil 
wrong and the disadvantaged class are those most 
severely injured by that wrong. BlockinS full 
recovery in these cases by the artificial 
limitation ~.fhieves no discernibly legitimate 
state goals.-
The court then summarized that 
This legislation forms a small powerless 
group with no conceivable benefit to the public at 
large except an illusion of action. The function 
of the jury trial is altered so that regardless of 
the facts produced, the court must reduce the 
verdict to a predetermined limitation. A sensitive 
class is formed and the important fundamental 
right to tr~l by jury is diminished by this 
legislation. 
Thus, the one million dollar cap imposed by section 8.01-581.15 was 
held to violate equal protection because it denied a sensitive class 
full compensation for damages incurred due to the negligence of 
medical practioners and infringed ul~n the important right to a jury 
trial without achieving any legitimate stat.e objectives. 
RAMIFICATIONS AND REX:OMMENDATIONS 
When construed together, Boyd and Williams highlight some 
troubling questions. The first deals with the choice of different 
equal protection standards. The second relates to the reasons why 
differing standards were selected. The third concerns the 
ramifications of the respective equal protection analyses employed. 
In Boyd, the statutory cap was held not to violate equal 
protection under the rational basis standard. This test was applied 
because the statute "creates neither a suspect classification nor 
infringes upon a fundamental right.n36 However, the cap was found to 
deny the right to a jury trial, a right the maintenance of which "'is 
of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and 
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment ••• should be scrutinized 
with the utmost care,."37 Apparently, L'nder Boyd, the seventh 
amendment right to a jury trial is of such importance--perhaps 
fundamentally so -- that any infringement deserves very careful 
scrutiny. Yet under the equal protection clause, the very same right 
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merits only the most c1eferential revie.... The result is inconsistent. 
The court sboulo bave ruled either that neither equal protection nor 
the right to a jury t.rial was oenieo, or alt.ernatively, applied a more 
rigorous standard of review in its equal protection analysis. 
In contrast to Boyd, the same statut(.)ry cap waH fOUfi(l to c1eny 
equal protection in Williams under the rational basis with heightened 
scrutiny standard. This test waH selected becC'.use the right to a jury 
trial and heightened scrutiny standard of Cleburne was deemed 
controlling. ~~though the coUrt acknowledged that Cleburne "was badly 
fragmented",3B and that its effect "is highly speculative since the 
holding remains something of a mystery,n39 it agreed that the rational 
basis test was used. 40 Cleburne used that test because "no 
fundamental rights were implicated."4l However, Judge Fortkort, 
relying on the dissenting portion of an opinion in which Justice 
~1arshall concurred in part. and dissenteo in part,42 interpreced the 
decision as authorizing a standard less deferential than the test 
used. In short, Judge Fortkort read Cleburne as creating a new level 
of equal protection review.43 ~i'hether this interpretation of Cleburne 
is correct remains to be seen. 
llnder either approach, the results are at the very least partially 
disturbing. The use of the Boyd approach allows the imposition of a 
one million dollar cap, regardless of injuries incurred, leaving the 
most seriously injured partially uncompensated. The use of the 
Wiliams approach permits unrestrained judgments with awards grossly 
disproportionate to actual injuries incurred. 
Whether or not the two equal protection standards were properly 
selected, the anaJys~§ in Boyg and Nilliams were correct under the 
respective tests. The courts could only assess the rationality and 
legitimacy of the statute by referring to the objectives cited in the 
Act's legislative history. The real crux of the problem then is the 
reason why the General Assembly acted at the time the statute was 
enrolled. 
The preamble to the Medical Malpractice Act of Virginia provides 
that 
Whereas, the General Assembly has determined that 
it is becoming increaSingly difficult for health 
care providers of the Commonwealth to obtain medical 
malpractice insurance with limits at affordable 
rates in excess of $750,000; and Whereas, the 
difficulty, cost and potential unavailability 0f 
such insurance has caused heal th care provide;: ci to 
cease providing services or to retire prematurely 
and has become a SUbstantial impairment to health 
care providers entering into practice in the 
Commonwealth and reduces or will tend to reduce the 
number of young people interested in or willing to 
enter health care careers; and 
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Whereas, these factors constitute a significant 
problem adversely affecting the public health, 
safety and welfare which necessitates the imposition 
of a limitation on the liability of health care 
providers in tort actions commf.rly referrecl to as 
medical malpractice cases • • ." 
As evidenced by the language used, the General Assembly's 
concerns were general and stated in very broad terms. Yet there is an 
appalling lack of evidence which would otherwise support the 
imposition of a cap on medical malpractice damages. Indeed, 
subsequent studies based on empirical evidence relating to Virginia's 
experience prior to the enactment of the cap demonstrate that there 
was no need for such action cap in 1976.45 In short, the legislature's 
actions were premature. The statutory scheme authori.zing a cap on 
damages in 1976 was a hasty response to a general nationw ide 
perception that a malpractice insurance crisis indeed existed. 
The time has come for the General Assembly to complete its 
examination of the posture of medical malpractice insurance in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. steps in the right direction have already 
been taken. A joint subcommittee is currently reviewing Virginia's 
medical malpractice laws and their effects on the adjudication of 
malpractice claims.46 The subcommittee needs to specifically address 
how exemplary damages affect the cost and availability of malpractice 
insurance in the Commonwealth, and the propriety of only restricting 
the amount of noneconomic damages. The current statutory denies full 
compenstaton for those who receive actual injury greater than one 
million dollars yet permits others who have nominal injuries to earn 
windfall profits on exemplary damages. By the same token, the absence 
of any limitation will simply encourage awards that are grossly 
disproportionate to actual injuries received. 
The General Assembly should enact legislaton which amends section 
8.01-581.15. A claimant should be entitled to receive full 
compensation for all economic damages incurred, but be denied awards 
for noneconomic damages that exceed a reasonable amount. A similar 
proposal has been endorsed by the Joint Subcommittee Studying the 
Liability Insurance Crisis and the Need for Tort Reform. 47 The 
proposal suggests a limitation on "the total amount awarded for 
noneconomic damages against all defendants found to be liable,·48 
including medical practitioners, to "the greater of three times the 
amount of damages awarded for economic losses or $250,000.,,49 
Although the joint subcommittee's proposal provides otherwise,50 
noneconomic damages should include punitive damages as well. Only in 
this way will all those injured by medical malpractice be able to 
receive full economic recovery. In addition, such an amendment would 
curtail grossly disproportionate exemplary awards, an evil that has 
contributed to the national medical malpractice insurance crisis. 
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Surrogate Parenting Aqreements in Virqinia 
Kristina Keech* 
Bruce McDougal** 
Due to the highly publicized Baby M trial recently decided in 
Hoboken, New Jersey,l Americans have been forced to consider the 
issues raised by Surrogate Parenting arrangements. 2 Cases 
testing the validity of such contracts have arisen in at least 
five states,3 but none have been brought in virginia. It is 
only a matter of time before such a case arises. How will a 
Virginia court interpret a surrogate parenting contract, what 
legal issues are raised by surrogate parenting contracts, and what 
regulations should be put in place to control and manage Surrogate 
Parenting Agreements? 
Surrogate parenting agreements are primarily used by married 
couples who have attempted to bear a child on their own and due to 
the woman I s infertility or genetic disorder are unable or are 
afraid to conceive. Approximately seventeen percent of all couples 
of reproductive age have difficulty becoming parents. 4 such 
couples frequently turn to legally sanctioned adoption to obtain a 
child, and are informed that if they pass the standards set up by 
the particular adoption agency or board they may have to wait 
three to seven years to obtain a child with certain 
characteristics. 5 The use of a surrogate mother allows the 
couple to have a child biologically related to the husband in less 
* Ms. Keech is a second- year student at Marshall-Wythe. 
** Mr. McDougal is a first year student at Marshall-Wythe, and is 
the Managing Editor of the Colonial Lawyer. 
I Stern v. Whitehead, N.J. (1987) 
2 A recent poll published in NeWSWeek Magazine showed that 63% 
of Americans approved of Surrogate Parenting agreements when the 
woman was infertile, 54% approved when a pregnancy would present a 
risk to the health of the woman, and only 14% approved when the 
woman was able to but was afraid or unwilling to bear a child. 
3 Stern v. Whitehead, N.J. (1987), In re Adoption of 
Baby Girl, L.J., 505 N.Y~2d 813~32 Misc.2d 972 (1986), 
Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Com. ex reI. Armstrong 
704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986), Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 362 N.W.2d 
211, 420 Mich. 367 (1985), Sherwyn & Handel v. California State 
Dept of Social Services, 218 Cal.Rptr. 778, 173 Cal.App.3d 52 
(1985), Doe v. Kelley, 106" Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981) 
4 Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for 
LeSislation, 44 La. L. Rev. 1641 (1984) Matter of Adoption of Baby Girl, L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 
(1986) 
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than a year. 
This note will summarize the technology involved, the moral, 
ethical and legal issues presented, the issues of which an 
attorney should be aware, and will propose legislative action to 
deal with the issues presented by Surrogate Parenting Agreements. 
Reproductive Technology 
Three major methods of "artificial conception" are in use in 
the united states today, artificial insemination, in vitro 
fertilization, and embryo transfer. 6 These methods overlap 
and are used together to overcome various reproductive 
difficulties. 
Artificial insemination is the most common and widely 
accepted technology. In artificial insemination (AI) a woman is 
impregnated by means of an artificial instrument, usually a 
syringe. The sperm used can be from any donor. Sperm can be 
"frozen" for extended periods of time. AI is used when the male 
of a couple is impotent or has a low sperm count, or when a woman 
wants to bear a child without a relationship with a man. 
In vitro fertilization occurs when the fertilization takes 
place in a laboratory medium outside any human body, and the 
growing embryo is then implanted in a woman's womb. Since the 
joining of the sperm and the ovum is conducted in a laboratory, 
they can come from any source. Embryos, like sperm, can be 
frozen. In vitro fertilization is used when a woman has blocked or 
damaged fallopian tubes but is capable of carrying a child to 
term. 
Embryo transfer refers to the relocation of a developing 
embryo from a laboratory culture medium to a human womb, or from 
one human womb to another. There is no requirement that the 
carrying woman be biologically related to the embryo which she 
carries to term. 
A "Surrogate Mother" is a woman carrying a fetus to term. for 
another person or persons who intend to raise the child produced. 
The surrogate can get pregnant either by artificial insemination 
6 For a more extensive discussion of the various reproductive 
technologies than we can afford here, see Wadlington, Artificial 
conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 Va. L. Rev. 465 
(1983); Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory 
for Legislation, 44 La. L. Rev. 1641 (1984); Note, Reproductive 
Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 Harv. 
L. Rev. 669 (1986). 
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with the father's sperm or the embryo can be produced in vitro and 
transferred to the surrogate's womb. This means that she mayor 
may not have a biological relationship to the child. For purposes 
of this article, "surrogate mother" will refer to a woman 
carrying a child produced by the joining of her ovum and a man's 
sperm through artificial insemination. She is therefore the 
child's biological mother. 
Moral, Ethical and Legal Issues 
There is no technological limitation to the identity or 
relationship of the parties who may employ artificial conception 
in order to reproduce. A lesbian who wishes to bear a child 
without the burdens of a relationship or marriage can be 
inseminated with the sperm of a nameless donor. A widow can bear 
the child of her long-dead husband. A couple can have a number of 
embryos created in the lab, bear one and freeze the rest. A 
single man who wishes to raise a child could have his baby borne 
by a surrogate mother. 
Each of these combinations produces it's own moral, ethical 
and legal dilemmas. This note will discuss only the issues raised 
by a surrogate parenting agreement wherein a married couple, of 
which the woman is incapable of ovulating and carrying a child, 
seeks out and pays a woman to be impregnated through artificial 
insemination with the sperm of the father and to carry the 
resulting fetus to term. She agrees to maintain certain health 
standards: not to smoke, drink, use drugs or to abort the fetus. 
She will remain under the care of a doctor throughout the term of 
her pregnancy. She agrees to sever her parental rights to the 
child and give custody to the father, and her husband agrees to 
sever any claim he may have if she is married. The contracting 
couple agree to pay all of the mother's medical and legal expenses 
plus a fee which can be either for her service of carrying the 
child or for severing her parental claim. The father's wife will 
adopt the child as her own, and the couple agrees that they will 
not refuse to take the child. 
Surrogate Parenting agreements raise a number of interesting 
moral issues: 
Surrogacy agreements weaken the venerated bond between 
the mother who bears the child and the child and therefore 
cheapens "motherhood.,,7 
7 However, surrogacy allows an infertile woman the ability to 
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Surrogacy agreements exploit women by making them 
professional breeders. Rather than being mothers they are 
producers of a product, chosen for their health, sturdiness 
and genetic make-up.8 
Surrogacy agreements will allow continued repression of 
the poor by the weal thy. Because of the cost of Surrogate 
Parenting arrangements only the wealthy will be able to 
consider it as a solution to infertility and it is likely that 
only poor women would consider being a surrogate. 9 
The compelling human interest in allowing Surrogate 
Parenting as an option to infertile couples isn't present if 
busy professional women are allowed to hire other women to 
bear their children for them merely so they do not have to 
take time out from their careers. lO 
Surrogacy agreements treat children as a commodity to be 
bought and sold, introducing the spectre of slavery which has 
been outlawed in this country.ll 
The children born of surrogate mothers are illegitimate, 
born out of adultery between the married father and the 
surrogate. 12 
The Roman Catholic Church believes that surrogate 
parenting, along with all forms of artificial conception, is 
unacceptable because the only appropriate way to produce a 
experience motherhood to a child born of her husband, one step 
closer than an adopted child unrelated to either of them. 
8 The counter-argument is that it's about time that women were 
allowed to profit from their unique ability to bear children: 
normal adoption procedures exploit women by prohibiting payment to 
the mother who bears the child while everyone else gets paid. 
9 In a positive manner, Surrogate Parenting can be viewed as a 
new and possibly lucrative field for women. Rather than being 
demeaning to bear a child for another woman, it could be viewed as 
a noble and honorable profession, and pretty well-paying, too. 
10 If the use of surrogates by fertile women is perceived as a 
problem, legislation could require a showing of infertility before 
being allowed to enter into a Surrogate Parenting Agreement. 
11 Adoption procedures normally require the payment of a fee to 
the agency and frequently involve the services of an attorney. A 
Surrogate Parenting agreement would include a payment to the woman 
bearing the child which can be for her services as a womb and not 
a payment for the child itself. 
12 This is biblically acceptable: Sarah, unable to bear her 
husband Abraham a child, directed him to Hagar, her Egyptian 
handmaiden. Hagar bore him Ishmael. Genesis 16:1-2, 15. In more 
modern times, the Uniform Parentage Act in force in some form in 
15 states, legitimates the chidren born to married women by 
artificial insemination and protects the anonymity of the sperm 
donor. The U.P.A. is in force in unchanged form in: Alabama, 
California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island, 
Washington, and wyoming. It is in force in amended form in 
Illinois and in substantially similar form in Ohio. Council of 
State Governments, The Book of States, 1986-87, 329 (1986). 
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child is naturally by married couples. 13 Any involvement of 
medical experts, technicians and laboratory workers further 
removes the act of reproduction from the marriage where it 
properly belongs, this view holds. Further, the participation 
of the surrogate as a third party fornicatress or adulteress 
makes the arrangement more objectionable. 14 
Ethical issues for attorneys include a possible conflict of 
interest if they represent both the contracting couple and the 
surrogate mother. If surrogate Parenting Agreements continue to 
exist only in the twilight between legality and criminality then 
attorneys will be able to charge contracting couples exorbitant 
fees and may be tempted to coerce women who have not been informed 
of all of the physical and psychological risks they incur to be 
surrogate mothers. 
Legal issues include state prohibitions against baby 
bartering, public policy issues, and a question of contract 
damages if the contract is to be acknowledged as valid. 
Prohibitions against Baby Bartering 
A couple's desire to have a child through a surrogate 
arrangement often is analyzed as conflicting with states' 
prohibitions on baby selling. 15 virginia has no express provision 
against baby-bartering, but does have prohibitions against payment 
of fees to physicians, attorneys or clergy in connection with 
recommendations for adoptions .16 A bill was introduced in the 
1987 General Assembly which would add "any remunerated assistance 
provided to a parent •.. in locating or effecting the placement of 
a child" to the definition of "unauthorized placement 
activity. 1117 This statutory language may be interpreted to 
preclude payments to professionals in connection with Surrogate 
Parenting arrangements. 
In Ford v. Ford the United states Supreme Court held that 
custody contracts are not binding in Virginia courts due to 
Virginia's SUbstantial interest in preventing the custody of 
13 Text of Vatican's Doctrinal statement on Human Reproduction, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at A14, col. 1. 
14 Although not all American Roman Catholics accept all of the 
teachings of their church, this view will affect the political 
discussion in those areas of the country with large concentrations 
of Roman Catholics. virginia is 5.1% Roman Catholic, compared with 
a~~roximatelY 25% nationwide. 
New York and Kentucky have found that state prohibitions 
against baby bartering do not apply to surrogate Parenting 
arrangements. Michigan has held that they do. See supra n. 2. 
16 Va. Code Ann. § 63.1-204 (c) (1) (Supp. 1986). 
17 H.R. 1496, 87 Sess., 1987 Virginia Laws. 
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children from being the subject of barter. 18 This indicates that 
a surrogate Parenting arrangement which is worded so that the 
payment seems to be for the custody of the child would be opposed 
to stated Virginia policy. 
A Virginia court may conclude that the concern with payments 
in connection with the custody of children is not applicable to a 
Surrogate Parenting Arrangement .19 The court could concur with 
the Kentucky court's reasoning in Surrogate Parenting Associates, 
Inc. v. Kentucky, 20 that "there are fundamental differences 
between the surrogate parenting procedure .•• and the buying and 
selling of children as prohibited by the statute. ,,21 Prohibition 
of baby selling is intended to prevent baby-brokers from 
pressuring parents with financial inducements to part with a 
child. Surrogate parenting arrangements involve an agreement 
voluntarily entered into before conception. Additionally, the 
payment is made by the natural father of the child, who presumably 
will act in the best interest of the child. Thus the evils sought 
to be prevented by prohibitions against baby-bartering are not 
present in surrogate Parenting arrangements. 
Given the stated policy in virginia against payments to third 
parties for the placement of children, a court would probably 
disallow any fees charged in connection with such an arrangement. 
The CUstody Dispute 
If a court does not recognize the contract, the conflict must 
be resolved as a traditional custody battle. Even if the court 
allows the contract as a custody agreement, in its role as parens 
patriae it is free to disregard the contract in determining the 
best interest of the child. 22 
The first major hurdle is establishing paternity. virginia 
has adopted a statute that presumes the legitimacy of a child born 
through artificial insemination to a married woman with the 
husband's permission. 23 Only the natural mother, the child, or 
the woman's husband can challenge the existence or non-existence 
18 371 U.S. 187 (1962). 
19 See Note, The Dilemma of Surrogate Parenthood, 73 Geo. L.J. 
l283-cI985)~ Gersz, The contract in surrogate Motherhood: A Review 
of the Issues, 12 Law, Med .. & Health Care 107, 109 (1984). But see 
Cohen, Surrogate Mothers: Whose Baby Is It? 10 Am. J.L. & Med. 
243 (1984). 
20 12 Fam. L. Rev. (BNA) 1207 (Ky. Cir. ct. 1986). 
21 Id. at 1207. 
22 Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962). 
23 Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-257 (D) (1950). 
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of the father-child relationship. Thus the biological father does 
not even have standing to challenge the paternity of the child. 
Thus the surrogate must be single or the surrogate must have 
already given up the child to the father for the father to bring a 
paternity action. This goes against the recommendations of 
attorneys involved in Surrogate Parenting arrangemens who prefer 
to use married women who have borne children before to ensure that 
they are able to bear children and that they will be emotionally 
more stable and therefore able to give up the children. 
This result indicates the inapplicability of Virginia's 
artificial insemination statute to the situation. The custody of 
the child would depend on the surrogate's marital status and 
disregard the intent of the parties and what is best for the 
child. Thus the natural father could rely on Syrkowski v. 
Appleyard24 and attempt to convince the court that the artificial 
insemination statute was not meant to apply to Surrogate Parenting 
arrangements. Surrogate Parenting should be recognized as an 
exception and the biological father should be allowed to prove his 
paternity. 
Assuming that the father can establish paternity, the court 
must then decide in whose custody to place the child. For the 
court to uphold a custody agreement, the co~tracting parents first 
have to show there was a voluntary relinquishment of custody by 
the parent of the child by clear, cogent and convincing 
evidence. 25 Although the surrogate mother can claim that she was 
not informed of and did not understand all the ramifications of 
the agreement, surrogate arrangements usually require the mother 
to go through counseling to ensure that she understands the nature 
of her agreement. Evidence of this counseling could then be used 
by the contracting couple to prove the surrogate's understanding. 
Even if the court upholds the contract as a custody 
agreement, it still has to apply conventional custody factors to 
determine the best interests of the child. 26 The welfare of the 
24 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985), (The Michigan Supreme 
Court overruled the Court of Appeals decision that the court 
lacked jurisdiction because the action was beyond the scope and 
purpose of the Paternity Act when a father sought an order of 
filiation declaring his paternity in a surrogate arrangement.), 
rev'd 122 Mich. App. 506, 33 N.W.2d 90 (1983). 
-ZS-Shortridge v. Deel, 224 Va. 589, 299 S.E.2d 500 (1983). 
26 Va. Code Ann. § 20-107.2(1) provides: "The court, in 
determining the custody ••. shall consider the following: a. The age 
and physical and mental condition of the child; b. The age and 
physical and mental condition of each parent; c. The relationship 
existing between each parent and each child; d. The needs of the 
child; e. The role which each parent has played, and will play in 
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child is the primary, paramount and controlling consideration of 
the court in custody disputes. 27 There is no presumption in favor 
of either parent. 28 
In a Surrogate Parenting agreement the age and physical and 
mental condition of the child will have little influence in 
determining custody. The court may consider if one parent is 
better equipped to deal with a particular physical or mental 
handicap of the child. 
In Stern v. Whitehead, the age and physical and mental 
condition of each parent had a significant effect on the court's 
decision regarding custody. Both the surrogate mother's mental 
stability and the reasons for the contracting mother's delay in 
childbirth were the subj ect of consideration, and the court's 
ultimate decision was affected by evidence about Mrs. Whitehead's 
mental health. 
The court will also encounter circumstances such as a 
homosexual couple's desire to have a chi1d,29 and a single 
person's right to have a chi1d. 30 
In examining the relationship between each parent and the 
child, the court may examine the psychological bonding between the 
natural mother and the child and the prior mental "conception" of 
the child by the contracting coup1e. 31 However, the court is most 
concerned with the best interest of the child, and therefore 
examines with which parent the child has developed bonding. It is 
important who was given temporary custody, because the courts look 
to the primary caretaker first to see if there is bonding and are 
reluctant to jeapardize the child's stability by changing 
custody. 
In assessing the needs of the child, the relative financial 
stability of the parents will be important. Surrogate Parenting 
arrangements usually involve a contracting couple which is 
wealthier than the surrogate and her husband, if any. Because the 
the future, in the upbringing and care of the child; and f. Such 
other factors as are necessary to consider the best interests of 
the child. 
27 Durrette v. Durrette, 223 Va. 328, 288 S.E.2d 432 (1982). 
28 Va. Code Ann. §20-107. 2 (1) (Supp. 1986). 
29 Jane Doe v. Jane Doe, 222 Va. 736, 284 S.E.2d 799 (1981), in 
which the natural mother's lesbian life-style was a proper factor 
to consider in determining her fitness as a mother and the best 
interest of the child. 
30 See Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights 
of the Unmarried, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 669 (1985). 
31 Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive 
Technologies, 96 Yale L. J. 187, 194-97 (1986). 
35 
court can consider who can provide better education and medical 
care, the wealthier couple will have the advantage. 
Similarly, in assessing the role which each parent has played 
and will play in the future in the upbringing and care of the 
child, the wealthier contracting couple will have an advantage 
over the surrogate and her husband because of their ability to 
provide a greater variety of opportunity for the child. 
Remedies for Breach of Contract 
If surrogate contracts are upheld, the court is faced with 
the problem of deciding what are the appropriate remedies for a 
breach of contract. Monetary damages are inadequate. The only way 
the contracting couple would be adequately compensated is by 
ensuring that they get the desparately wanted child. 
Some moral and legal problems arise when specific performance 
forces a mother to give up her child. Commentators note that a 
court is unlikely to wrest a child out of it's natural mother's 
arms. 32 Research has shown that surrogate mothers develop an 
emotional attachment to the child which they carry. 33 "This 
attachment between mother and child is apparent in the case 
histories of even those surrogates who have parted with their 
newborns.,,34 While the surrogate contracts that she will not form 
or attempt to form a bond to the child, "even the best intentioned 
surrogates develop an emotional attachment to the child they are 
carrying. ,,35 
However, refusing to award specific performance when the 
natural mother breaches the surrogate contract would leave no 
adequate remedy for the natural father. Specific performance as an 
equi table remedy should balance the hardship to the defendant 
(surrogate) against the benefit to the plaintiff (contracting 
couple) that would ensue from the enforcement of the contract. In 
balancing the equities, the court should consider both the mental 
and physical aspects of conception: the contracting couple's 
intent to conceive predates the surrogate mother's physical 
conception, and her pregnancy would not have occured but for the 
contracting couple's intent to have a child. 36 Thus the use of 
the surrogate method, manifesting procreative intent, should 
32 Cohen, supra n. 19, at 260. 
33 M. Klaus & J. Kennell, Maternal-Infant Bonding (1976). 
34 Cohen, supra n. 19 at 260 & n. 130. 
35 Id. at 26l. 
36 Stumpf, supra n. 35 at 195. 
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invoke the legal presumption that the child belongs to the 
intenders. The court can then order specific performance of the 
contract giving custody to the contracting couple. 
By presuming that the contracting couple are the legal 
parents after birth, but allowing the surrogate mother to contest 
the presumption, both the pre-birth and after-birth psychological 
and psysiological factors can be factored in to the custody 
decision. 37 A parent seeking to change custody previously awarded 
to the other parent (or relinquished) bears the burden of showing 
that a return of the child is in the best interest of the 
child. 38 Similarly where the court enforces a surrogate contract 
and the father gets custody of the child, the mother would have 
the burden of proving that a change in custody is in the child's 
best interest. 39 The contracting couple would know that the 
surrogate could challenge the contract or custody but be willing 
to risk it just as in adoption contracts. A liquidated damages 
clause would establish the amount the surrogate would have to pay 
for the breach. 
This solution allows balancing of the competing interests in 
the child and still allows new reproductive techniques. It allows 
the mother some control over whether to give the child up while 
also protecting the biological father and the original intent of 
the parties. It is an appropriate remedy in Virginia where courts 
consider the interests of both of the parents along with the 
welfare of the child. 
Policy Recommendations 
Surrogate Parenting agreements serve a need by allowing 
couples who want to have a child but are unable to conceive to 
obtain a child biologically related to the male of the couple. It 
has been acceptable for years to use artificial insemination to 
obtain children biologically related to the female of a couple. 40 
37 In determining the custody of infants, the natural rights of 
the parents are entitled to due consideration. Burton v. Russell, 
190 Va. 339, 57 S.E.2d 95 (1958). But the welfare of the child is 
to be regarded more highly than the technical legal rights of the 
parent. Forbes v. Haney, 204 Va. 712, 133 S.E.2d 533 (1963). 
38 Harper v. Harper, 217 Va. 477, 229 S.E.2d 875 (1976). 
39 Shortridge v. Deel, 224 Va. 589, 299 S.E.2d 500 (1983), (Once 
relinquishment of custody is established, the natural parent who 
seeks to regain custody must bear the burden of proving that such 
change is in the child's best interest.) 
40 The Uniform Parentage Act, which is in force in 15 states 
not including Virginia, (see supra. n. 12), serves to make 
artificial insemination acceptable by legitimizing a child born to 
a married woman through artificial insemination, protecting the 
anonymity of the sperm donor and putting the woman's husband's 
37 
Confusion arises over surrogate Parenting only because of the 
necessary involvement of a woman to carry and bear the child. 
Legislation must take into account and clearly define her legal 
status. 
We propose that legislative action similar to the uniform 
parenthood Act be taken with the goal of legalizing and 
recognizing Surrogate Parenting agreements as an acceptable method 
of reproduction. 
Parties which must be involved are: the contracting couple, 
the surrogate, physicians who will perform the insemination, care 
for the pregnant surrogate and deliver. the baby, an attorney for 
the couple and an attorney for the surrogate. 
A couple wishing to have a child would file a request with 
a clinic charged with approving couples for this purpose, and they 
would be evaluated as to whether or not they would provide a good 
home for the proposed child. This preliminary custody finding 
would be presumptively valid and could not be challenged unless at 
the time the child was born there had been a signifigant change in 
the position of the couple: they had separated or divorced, one of 
them had died, became disabled or mentally ill, or there had been 
a significant change in their financial position. 
with a preliminary custody finding the clinic would proceed 
to employ the surrogate. She must have been evaluated medically 
Ind psychologically and be fully informed as to the medical, 
emotional and legal risks involved. The couple pays all of her 
medical and legal bills as they are incurred, take a life 
insurance policy on her for the benefit of her heirs, bond her for 
performance, and pay her one-half of the agreed upon fee at the 
time she is inseminated. 
Upon the birth of the child the paternity is confirmed, the 
father is listed on the birth certificate and the surrogate gives 
up the child to the wife in a step-parent adoption after the court 
confirms the preliminary custody finding. When this is complete 
the second half of the fee is paid to the surrogate. 
At two points the surrogate's special role as mother must be 
taken into account. While she is pregnant she has the right to 
decide to· abort the fetus. 41 If she does so she must reimburse 
name on the birth certificate even though he is not the biological 
father. Va. Code § 32.1-257(0) (1950) has substantially the same 
effect by legitimizing the child born of artificial insemination 
to a married woman and maintains a fiction of the paternity of the 
woman's husband. 
41 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
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the couple for all expenses to that date and a performance bond in 
her name pays the couple liquidated damages . After the birth of 
the child, if she succesfully challenges the preliminary custody 
finding and retains the child she must reimburse the couple for 
expenses and for liquidated damages. 
We place a strong incentive on the, surrogate to go through 
with the contract because she is only an accesory to the couple's 
decision to have a child. Were the couple fertile neither the 
state nor the surrogate would be able to interfere with that 
decision. In an adoption proceeding the state must decide if the 
couple is a fit pair to raise an existing child. Here, the child 
does not exist yet, and the state should have minimal control over 
whether or not a couple can become parents. 
An ideal regulatory scheme will encourage the creation of 
licensed Surrogate Parenting clinics which would have staffs of 
trained doctors, counselors and attorneys. They would have contact 
with a number of surrogates of proven medical and psychological 
fitness. They would create standardized methods and procedures 
limiting the medical and legal risk to all parties involved, 
reducing the cost to interested couples and maximizing the 
availability of this solution to the problem of infertility. 
Virginia would be in the forefront of states by legitimizing 
and regulating Surrogate Parenting Agreements and would provide a 
great service to it's citizens who wish to become parents but are 
unable to do so. 
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SEX DISCRIMINATION IN ATHLETICS 
By 
Steven T. Buck* 
Discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs is 
prohibitied both by federal law I and by the Constitution.2 Despite 
this fact, intercollegiate athletics continue to be a male domain3, 
resisting change and integration nearly as fervently as the post-Brown 
South. Disparity in treatment continues and a substantial basis 
exists, both constitutional and statutory, for asserting unequal 
protection of the law. 
This Comment is an attempt to analyze the current state of gender 
discrimination in athletics. The applicability of Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 to Virginia athletic programs 
particularly intercollegiate athletics -- will be studied. 
Effect of Title IX 
Dispari ty between the rights of males and females in Amer ican 
society has been the norm,4 and athletics have proven to be no 
exception. 5 While Congress, by enacting Title IX, was primarily 
attempting to eliminate sex discrimination in education, its effect on 
intercollegiate athletics has received the most public attention and 
caused the greatest controversy.6 
Congress' delegated formation and enforcement of regulations 
defining the statute's broad language to the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW).? HEW's implementing regulations apply 
the statute's broad prohibition against sex discrimination to specific 
education programs, including intercollegiate athletics.8 
Title IX provides that "[nlo person ••• shall, on the basis of sex, 
be excluded from part.icipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subject to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving federal funds."9 The conflict in interpretation has come in 
defining the term "program". A debate rages as to whether the statute 
should apply only to particular programs within an institution (the 
programmatic approach), or whether it should encompass all programs 
within institutions receiving federal funds {the institutional 
* Mr. Buck is a 2d year student at Marshall-W'ythe School of Law and 
a member of the National Moot Court Team. 
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approach) • This controversy especially applies to the area of 
athletics since very few federal gr~nts are earmarked for athletic 
programs.lO Therefore, a strictly programmatic approach would tend to 
make Title IX virtually meaningless as it relates to athletics. 
The legislative history of Title IX provides little evidence as 
to Congress' intentions regaroing the statute's applicability to 
intercollegiate ath1etics.ll Only after Congress realized that HEvl's 
regulations included athletic programs did Congress pause to consider 
the ramifications of such an action. Several efforts to exempt 
athletics from the statute's scope were thwarted.12 Congress chose 
instead to enact the Javits Amendment, which called for the Secretary 
of HEW to publish regulations implementing Title IX "which shall 
include with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities reasonable 
provisions considering the nature of particular sports."13 Congres~ 
thus clearly felt that athletic programs fell within the scope of 
Title IX. 
As the legislative history provides no clear indication of the 
intended meaning of the words "program or activity", parallels between 
Title IX and analogous statutes could prove helpful. The language 
contained in both Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196414 and 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197315 is identical to that 
of Title IX 16, and similar issues have arisen under these statutes. 
Under Title VI, the Fourth Circuit has held that even indirect 
federal aid 17 to a university can trigger enforcement of Title VI on 
an institution-wide basis.18 The same rationale was adopted in 
Yakin v. University of Illinois,19 allowing Yakin to sue for wrongful 
dismissal under Title VI despite the fact that that the psychology 
department in which he worked received no federal funds. In contrast, 
the Fifth Circuit took a strict programmatic approach.20 
Two recent district court decisions under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Wright v. Columbia university2l and 
Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education,22 took an institutional 
approach to intepreting the statute. Both cases involved 
discrimination against the handicapped in athletics, making the issues 
involved significantly similar to those arising under Title IX. 
In Wright, the plaintiff claimed relief under section 504 
claindng that Columbia University was discriminating against him by 
not allowing him to play football because he had sight only in his 
left eye. The plaintiff claimed, and his coaches agreed, that he was 
otherwise qualified to play. Columbia claimed that plaintiff had no 
section 504 action because Columbia's athletic program did not receive 
federal funds and therefore was outside the statute's scope. The 
court held that because the school as a whole received federal funds 
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and because the school administration (not the athletic department, 
which sided with the plaintiff) had discriminated against plaintiff, 
an institutional approach would best serve to effectuate the 
underlying policy of the statute in this case. The court enjoined the 
defendant's discrinlinatory act.ions. 
In Poole, a student with only one kidney brought an action under 
section 504 against the school board for denying him the right to 
participate in his high school's interscholastic wrestling program due 
to his handicap. lUthough the athletic departD.ent did not receive any 
federal funds, the court relied on the elerr.ent of control exercised by 
the school board over the program in applying the institutional 
approach in this case. 
Courts also have interpreted Title IX's "program or activity" 
term in contexts other than athletics. Two recent Supreme Court 
cases, North Haven Board of Education v. Bel1 23 and Grove City 
College v. Bell,24 have preempted the field on this question. These 
cases read in tander,. answer many questions in the programmatic versus 
institutional debate, while raj sing nlany new questions. 
North Haven involved a tenured school teacher who was not rehired 
after taking what was to be a one year maternity leave. The teacher 
filed a Title IX complaint with HEW claiming sex discrin1ination in a 
program receiving federal funds. HEW began to investigate the 
employment practices of the North Haven School Board. Asserting that 
HEW lacked authority to regulate employment practices under Title IX, 
the Board sought declaratory relief. 25 The Second Circuit held for 
HEW and the Supreme Court affirmed. 
The Court held that Title IX must be given a broad sweep to 
effectuate its remedial purposesi26 therefore, employillent 
discrimination in federally financed education programs falls within 
its scope. The Cou rt did not read "prog ram or act i vi ty" so broadly 
however. "Title IX's legislative history corraborates its general 
program-specificity."27 The Court then refused to define "program", 
preferring instead to rely on a Fift_h Circuit decision holding that 
federal funds may be terminated upon a finding that they "are infected 
by a discriminatory environment •• 28 If discrimination is found, the 
Court held that the federal funds would be so infected. Although the 
Court continually emphasized the program-specific nature of Title IX, 
the analysis it used appeared very similar to the instututional 
approach. 
Grove City involved a suit by Grove City College and four of its 
students which sought to declare void a Department of Education (ED) 
action terminating federal financial assistance to students attending 
the college.29 This action was taken in response to the college's 
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refusal to execute an Assurance of Compliance with ED regulations 
prohibiting sex discrimination in educational programs receiving 
federal financial assistance. The college claimed both that it did 
not receive federal financial assistance within the IT.eaning of Title 
IX and that the ED had never proven sex discrimination in any program 
or activity at the college.30 
The Court held that Grove City College did indeed receive federal 
funds within the meaning of Title IX. Federal funds which are 
funneled into the school through Basic Educational Opportunity Grants 
(BEaG) to students attending the school (so-called indirect aid) 
trigger Title IX coverage as surely as do federal funds going directly 
to the school. The Court cited Bob Jones University v. Johnson 31 
and the legislative history of Title IX as supporting that result.32 
The court then held that a finding of actual discrimination was 
not necessary before the termination of federal funds. A refusal to 
execute a proper Assurance of Compliance warranted the Department's 
action because Title IX requires compliance with all regulations 
adopted pursuant thereto.33 
Although these two issues were the only ones presented by this 
case, the Court went on to hold that the receipt of BEOG grants by the 
college's students diel not trigger institution-wide coverage under 
Title IX. The BEaG funds represented financial assistance to the 
college's financial aid program; thus, that program was held to be 
properly regulated under Title IX. The fact that federal funds 
eventually reach the college's general operating budget cannot subject 
it to institution-wide coverage. The majority opinion spoke in no 
uncertain terms of the program-specific nature of Title IX, and 
applied it consistent with that nature. 34 
Very vocal support was given the institutional approach by 
Justice Brennan writing in elissent.35 According to Brennan, the Court 
completely disregarded the broad remedial purposes of Title IX that 
controlled in North Haven. He also attacked the programmatic approach 
as contrary to congressional intent as shown by the legislative 
history.36 
Brennan's view of the majority oplnJ.on may be a bit pessimistic, 
however. The Court's opinion in Grove City diel not reject 
institution-wide coverage in general, but only on the facts of that 
case.37 The Court seemed to suggest in dicta that nonearmarked 
grants, for example, would trigger institution wide-coverage.38 The 
Court merely disapproved of the "ripple effect" theory -- that funds 
earmarked for one program necessarily freed up funds for other 
programs creating an institution-wide effect in every case. 
43 
Title IX and Athletics 
Several cases have dealt directly with Title IX's impact on 
athletic programs. Courts and jurisdictions are almost evenly split 
as to whether to apply Title IX using an institutional or programmatic 
approach. 
The Third Circuit in Haffer v. Temple39 adopted the institutional 
approach to Title IX. Haffer involved a class action brought by 
Temple students alleging sex discrimination in the university's 
athletic programs. The Court found first that opportunities and 
expenditures for the men's programs were grossly disproportionate to 
those given the women's programs. The Court next found that although 
none of the $19,000,000 in federal assistance given to Temple was 
earmarked for the athletic department, the receipt of these funds 
benefitted all areas of the university and triggered institution-wide 
Title IX coverage.40 Haffer relied heavily on the Third Circuit's 
earlier ruling in Grove City College v. Bell.4l It remains unclear how 
Haffer's precedential value will be affected by the subsequent Supreme 
Court modification of Grove City. 
The Sixth Circuit was unimpressed by this analysis, ruling in 
Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board42 that a fair reading of the plain 
language of Title IX demands the adoption of the programmatic 
approach. Othen involved an allegation of sex discrimination in an 
Ann Arbor athletic program.43 The only federal funds received by the 
school district were federal impact grants. 44 Because these funds 
were indirect and nonearmarked, the court held that they could not be 
considereo to bring athletic programs wi thin the scope of Title IX. 
The authority of this holoing, however, m.ay be affected by dicta in 
Grove City College v. Bel1 4S suggesting that nonearmarked aid, either 
direct or inoirect, could trigger institution-wide coverage. 
In University of Richmond (UR) v. Bell,46 the university sought 
injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the Department of 
Education from investigating its athletic program for Title IX 
violations. UR claimed that because its athletic department received 
no federal funds, it could not be subject to Title IX regulation. The 
court, relying heavily on the dicta in North Haven supporting the 
programmatic approach,47 rejected the ED's contention that BEOG funds 
combined with Library Resource Grants48 could be sufficient to trigger 
institution-wide Title IX coverage. 
The court instead ruled that the Library Resource Grants could 
only trigger Title IX coverage for the library program, and that BEOG 
funds were not direct aid and could not trigger Title IX coverage at 
all. Therefore, the athletic program did not fall within the scope of 
Title IX and the ED was enjoined from investigating any program or 
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activity within the district court's juristiction "absent a showing 
that the program or activity is the receipient of direct federal 
financial assitance (emphasis added) ."49 The authority of this case 
is, of course, questionable as its distinction between direct and 
indirect federal assistance was expressly overruled by the Supreme 
Court in Grove City College v. Bell.50 
It is readily apparent that the case law before 1984 can be only 
marginally useful in determining the present state of Title IX 
analysis. Grove City completely altered the Title IX landscape. 
It now renlains for the courts of appeals to analyze and interpret this 
holding. 
The Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on Grove City in 
Arline v. School Board of Nassau County. 51 The case involved Arline, 
a school teacher who had been fired due to her relapses of 
tuberculosis. Arline sued in federal court alleging a violation of 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court first considered 
whether federal impact aid 52 qualified as "federal financial 
~ssistance" under section 504 and if so, whether such assistance 
triggered coverage of plaintiff's program. The court held that impact 
funds were clearly nonearmarked monies which, according to the dicta 
in Grove City , triggered institution-wide coverage. The court 
reasoned that adoption of this approach gave full effect to the broad 
legislative intent expressed in section 504. 
A comprehensive and thoughtful analysis refining and analyzing 
the scope of Title IX as it relates to Grove City was provided in 
O'Connor v. Peru State College,53 an Eighth Circuit decision dealing 
with Title IX's application to athletic programs. This case involved 
a women's basketball coach who was not rehired and brought a Title IX 
sex discrimination action against the college. 
The federal financial assistance relied upon by O'Connor was a 
Title III faculty research grant. 54 A central research facility wo.s 
established, and the physical education department was granted access 
to the facility and funds. The district court held that the funds did 
not constitute federal financiol assistance under Title IX because the 
funds did not go "directly" to the physical education department and 
because other departments of the school also benefitted.55 
The appellate court overruled this finding, citing Grove Citv as 
expressly rejecting the direct/indirect funding distinctions. Just as 
the student aid in Grove City was no less federal funds for being 
channeled through students, the research funds were no less federal 
funds for being channelled through an administrative structure. 
The district court concluded that granting Title IX coverage to 
the physical education department would be a ratification of the 
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institutional approach, a result the district court believed to be 
contrary to Grove City. The appellate court disagreed again, holding 
that the SuprelTle Court in Grove City did not reject institution-wide 
coverage in general, but only on the facts of the case. The Court 
contemplated that nonearnl<irkE'o funds would trigger program-specific 
coverage. Consistent with this dichotomy, the Court explicitly 
rejected the "ripple effect" theory. 
The Eighth Circuit Court believed that the earmarked/ 
nonearrearked dichotomy was the appropriate approach in light of 
Grove City, and that it could be a workable standard if the term 
earmarked is correctly defined.57 The Court in Grove City held that 
the federal funds were "earmarked" for the financial aid program 
hecause Congress' purpose was to supplement the college's own 
financial aid resources. Thus, if Congress intended that Title III 
funds should be available to all departlTlents within the college, all 
should fall within Title IX's coverage. The court held that this was 
indeed Congress' intent in this instance.58 
Analysis 
Sex discrimination in athletics can be psychologically damaging 
to the woman athlete.59 Denial of the opportunity to participate in 
athletic programs may halt a woman athlete's further development thus 
denying her both the physical and psychological benefits of sport.60 
Although women increasingly do participate in interscholastic and 
intercollegiate athletics, equality of opportunity and funding between 
men's and women's programs has not yet been attained.61 
The stated goal of Title IX is the elimination of sex 
discrimination in education. The legislative intent underlying the 
statute consisted of both a desire to ensure through educational 
opportunity that all Americans develop their full potential, and a 
desire to eliminate sex stereotyping in our society.62 
All that remains is to establish an approach which allows a court 
to reach a result that satisfies the spirit of Title IX without 
straining the statute's language beyond its logical meaning. The 
approach taken by the Supreme Court in Grove City goes far toward such 
a goal. The elimination of the direct/indirect financial aid 
dichotomy found in many lower courts substantially furthered the 
spirit of Title IX without contradicting its plain language. 
The earmarked/nonearmarked financial aid dichotomy, with its 
express disapproval of the "ripple effect" theory, has been severely 
criticized by some commentators who claim that it undermines the 
spirit and underlying policy of Title IX.63 These commentators point 
out that this interpretation could allow institutions to circumvent 
the remedial purpose of Title IX.64 
Such an analysis, however, could be reading Grove City too 
broadly. The Supremem Court acknowleged that the legislative history 
contained evidence "that entire institutions are subject to the 
nondiscrimination provision whenever one of their programs receives 
federal assistance" but that such a condition was not warranted by the 
"circumstances present here."65 It is unfortunate that the Court did 
not elaborate as to what circumstances would trigger institution-wide 
coverage in the case of an earmarked grant. 
North Haven provides an example of such a circumstance. While 
stressing the program-specific nature of Title IX, the Court stated 
that where federal funds in one program are "infected by a 
discriminatory environment" created by a second program, both programs 
must come within Title IX's scope. 66 The Court quoted 
Board of Public Instruction of Taylor County Florida v. Finch,67 a 
case involving discrimination in admissions policies. Such 
discrimination was held to infect all programs within the system, 
subjecting all to Title IX coverage. 
Another such circumstance may be analogized from the holdings in 
Poole and Wright. These cases stand for the proposition that if the 
university as a whole was the official or actual decisionmaker in 
promulgating the discriminatory rule or action, institution-wide 
coverage should apply.68 This approach prevents "programs" which are 
not really discrete entities but merely controlled subsidiaries from 
insulating themselves from Title IX coverage. 
This earmarked/nonearmarked dichotomy, limited to the facts of 
Grove City by exceptions such as the aforementioned, would in reality 
not be the bane to sexual equality its critics claim. Very few 
athletic departments are not controlled by college presidents or 
university boards of visitors, and those very few that are totally 
independent clearly must come within the program-specific language of 
the statute. 
Conclusion 
Title IX actions are very rare in Virginia athletics. 
University of Richmond v. Bell, by applying a strictly programmatic 
approach, has had a chilling efffect on the bringing of similiar 
suits. Such a result sharply contradicts the legislative purpose 
behind Title IX. A new approach consistent with Grove City, 
North Haven, the language of the statute, and the legislative intent 
is needed. 
Neither the strictly programmatic nor the strictly institutional 
approach to Title IX can successfully reconcile the program-specific 
language of the statute with its underlying policy goals. Courts are 
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obligated to honor the clear meaning of the statute, as revealed by 
its language, purpose, and history.70 Therefore, courts must look 
closely at the relationship between the federal assistance and the 
athletic department. If the athletic program benefits, either 
directly or indirectly from the federal funds, or is controlled by 
someone who does, it should be subject to the anti-discrimination 
policies of Title IX. 
In this way, Virginia's courts can continue to honor the clear 
language of the statute, while still moving toward the statute's 
ultimate goal of sexual equality. Such a reading will not end sex 
discrimination in athletics, but it should land several well-aimed 
blows. 
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VIRGINIA'S NEW MANDATORY SEAT BELT LEGISLATION: 
DEATH KNELL FOR THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE 
By E. Diana Hamner and John H. Pitcher, Jr •• 
On March 27, 1987, Virginia joined twenty-four states plus 
the District of Columbia requiring mandatory seat belt use. 1 
Passage of the legislation was the cUlmination of five years of 
consideration by the Virginia General Assembly. 2 Across the 
nation state legislatures have given recent attention to seat belt 
laws because of intense lobbying by automobile manufacturers3 in 
response to the Department of Transportation's (DOT) enactment of 
the Occupant Crash Protection Rule in 1984. 4 The DOT will 
require manufacturers to equip all cars with air bags or front-
seat automatic belts beginning in 1990 unless states containing 
two-thirds of the population adopt seat belt laws by April 1, 
1989. 5 
• Ms. Hamner is a second year student at Marshall-Wythe, and 
she has a B.S. in Business from Wake Forest University. Mr. 
Pitcher is a first year student. He has a B.A. in Political 
Science from Catholic University. 
IVa. Code § 46.1-309.2 (March 27, 1987). See Cal. Veh. 
Code § 27315 (West Supp. 1987); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-
100a (West supp. 1987); D.C. Code Ann. § 40-1601 (1986); Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 316.614 (West Supp. 1987); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 
291-11.6 (1985); Idaho Code § 49-764 (Supp. 1986); 111. Ann. 
Stat. ch. 95.5, para. 12-603.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); Iowa 
Code Ann. § 321.445 (West Supp. 1987); Ran. Stat. Ann. § 8-
2501 (Supp. 1986); La. Rev. Stat. Annn. § 32.295.1 (West 
Supp. 1987); Md. Transp. Code Ann. § 22-412.3 (Supp. 1986); 
Mich. Camp. Laws Ann. § 257.710e (West Supp. 1987); Minn. 
Stat. Ann. § 169.686 (West 1986); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 307.178 
(Vernon Supp. 1987); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39.3-76.2f (West Supp. 
1986); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-370 (Supp. 1986); N.Y. Veh. & 
Traf. Law § 1229-c (McKinney 1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-
135.2A (Supp. 1985); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4513.26.3 
(Anderson Supp. 1986); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 12-416 
(West Supp. 1987); Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-603 (Supp. 1986) 
(repealed effective June 30, 1990); Tex. Rev. civ. Stat. Ann. 
art. 6701d (Vernon Supp. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-181 
(Supp. 1986); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 46.61.688 (1987). 
Nevada also has a statute on the books, but effective date 
has not been determined. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 484.641 
(Michie 1986). 
2Del. J. Samuel Glasscock (D-Suffolk), sponsor of the seat 
belt bill, introduced a similar measure during the 1983-1986 
Sessions of the Virginia General Assembly. 
3In Virginia alone in 1986, approximately $200,000 went 
into a statewide educational program and lobbying on behalf 
of the seat belt bill. Richmond Times Dispatch, Feb. 5, 
1986, at A-5, col. 1. 
449 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1985). The purpose of the rule is to 
reduce the number of traffic deaths and severe injuries to 
automobile occupants. See id. 
SId. - -
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The DOT has outlined minimum criteria for state mandatory 
safety belt usage laws required to prevent enforcement of the 
passive restraint rule. 6 One of the requirements is that the 
seat belt defense be allowed by the defendant in mitigation of 
damages. 7 The seat belt defense "refers to attempts to have 
testimony regarding a plaintiff's failure to use an available seat 
belt at the time of an accident admitted into evidence to show 
either the plaintiff's negligence or failure to mitigate 
damages. ,,8 A defendant who invokes the seat belt defense tries 
to prove that the plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt caused or 
aggravated the plaintiff's injuries, thus reducing or barring the 
recoverable damages. 9 By denying plaintiff's full recovery for 
injuries resulting from automobile accidents if they fail to wear 
a seat belt, "the seat belt defense may prove to be far more 
incentive to use seat belts than a traffic ticket or a minor 
fine. ,,10 
The new Virginia law fails to meet the federal requirements 
because it clearly outlaws the use of a violation of the section 
on the mitigation of damages issue, forbidding the use of the seat 
belt defense in Virginia. 11 The General Assembly had 
previously mandated that the failure to use seat belts "shall not 
be deemed to be negligence nor shall evidence of such nonuse of 
6See id. 
7The law must include: 
A provision specifying that the violation of the belt 
usage requirement may be used to mitigate damages with 
respect to any person who is involved in a passenger car 
accident while violating the belt usage requirement and who 
seeks in any subsequent litigation to recover damages for 
injuries resulting from the accident. 
49 C.F.R .. § 571.208. 
8Marema, A New Perspective on the Duty to Buckle Up, 27 For 
the Def 23 (1985). This article's focus is on the use of the 
seat belt defense in the mitigation of damages. 
9Westenberg, The Safety belt Defense at Trial and In Out-
of-Court settlement, 37 U. Fla. L. Rev. 785 at 785 (1985). 
lOId. at 29. But see Miller v. Miller, 237 N.C. at 237, 160 
S.E.2d at 73 (1968). 
11The Bill provides: 
A violation of this section shall not constitute 
negligence, be considered in mitigation of damages of 
whatever nature, be admissible in evidence or be the subject 
of comment by counsel in any action for the recovery of 
damages arising out of the operation, ownership or 
maintenance of a motor vehicle, nor shall anything in this 
section change any existing law, rule or procedure pertaining 
to any such civil action. 
Va. Code Ann. § 46.1-309.2(E). 
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such devices be considered in mitigation of damages of whatever 
nature. ,,12 Several other states have also specifically precluded 
the use of the seat belt defense in mitigation of damages despite 
the DOT's requirements. 13 The possibility exists that if enough 
states adopt mandatory seat belt laws, the DOT requirement of a 
seat belt defense will be modified. 14 
The Virginia Law: Va. Code § 46.1-309.2 
Passage of Virginia's new mandatory seat belt use law was a 
long fought victory, but a weak one in terms of enforcement of the 
law and incentives to ensure usage of seat belts. The new law 
requires most drivers and front-seat passengers to use seat 
belts.15 The bill was passed only after much compromise. The 
law is essentially identical to the bill that the Senate approved 
during the 1986 session but was defeated on a tie-breaking vote by 
Lt. Gov. L. Douglas Wilder. During the 1987 session of the 
Virginia General Assembly, the Senate voted down a measure 
allowing a voter referendum to determine the fate of the seat belt 
law. 16 
The mandatory seat belt law will become effective January 1, 
1988. 17 During 1987, the state police and the Department of 
Motor Vehicles will conduct a campaign to encourage compliance and 
public awareness. Legislators hope that the seat belt law's 
"mere presence in the code [will] encourage thousands of 
Virginians to buckle up.,,18 
The law includes several exemptions. If a licensed physician 
determines that use of a seat belt is impractical for medical 
reasons, a person will be exempt if he carries the doctor's 
statement with him. 19 The law does not apply to law enforcement 
officers in certain situations. 20 Rural mail carriers, rural 
newspaper route carriers, newspaper bundle handlers, newspaper 
12Va. Code Ann. § 46.1-309.1 (1986). 
13D.C., Ind., Kan. and utah. See statutes cited supra note 
1. 
14Richmond Times Dispatch, Feb. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 1. 
15Va. Code § 46.1-309.2 (March 27, 1987). 
16Richmond Times Dispatch, Feb. 17, 1987, at 1, col. 3. The 
Senate voted 23 to 16 against a seat belt referendum. 
17Va. Code § 46.1-309.2(2) (March 27, 1987). 
18Richmond Times Dispatch, Mar. 8, 1986, at A-6, col. 1. 
19Va. Code § 46.1-309.2 (C) (1) (March 27, 1987). 
20Va. Code § 46.1-309.2(C) (2) (March 27, 1987). 
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rack carriers and taxicab drivers are all exempt from the 
statute. 21 
The only punishment for a violation of the law is a twenty-
five dollar civil penalty that will be credited to the Literary 
Fund. 22 A violation of the section can in no way be used against 
the violator in court. 23 The greatest amount of debate in the 
1986 session centered on the method of charging motorists with a 
violation. The approved version of the law restricts police to 
enforcing the seat belt law only after they have charged the 
driver for an unrelated motor vehicle violation such as running a 
stop sign or speeding. In 1986, the Senate urged a version 
allowing police to charge motorists any time they see a 
violation. 24 The House would not approve this stronger 
version. 25 Essentially, law-abiding citizens who refuse to wear 
a seat belt will never be charged with a violation of the seat 
belt law. 
The Seat Belt Defense 
The question of whether a plaintiff's nonuse of an available 
seat belt is admissible in mitigation of damages has produced a 
split of authority. A sUbstantial number of courts which have 
considered the seat belt defense in terms of mitigation of damages 
have decided that evidence of nonuse may not be admitted. The 
minority position allows admittance of such evidence. This 
article surveys both positions to draw conclusions about whether 
the virginia General Assembly might consider amending the new 
21Va. Code § 46.1-309.2(C) (3) and (C) (4) (March 27, 1987). 
"Del. William P. Robinson Jr., D-Norfolk, said that the 
exemption for taxi drivers was needed because some. have had 
belts used to restrain them during robberies." Richmond 
Times Dispatch, Jan. 31, 1986, at A-10, col. 1. 
22Va. Code § 46.1-309.2(0) (March 27, 1987). The Virginia 
law complies with DOT criteria which requires a penalty of 
not less than $25.00. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208. 
23See supra n. 11. 
24Richmond Times Dispatch, Feb. 26, 1986, at A-6, col. 1. 
25Some legislators feared that law enforcement officers 
would use the law to harrass violators if given the freedom 
to charge motorists any time they saw a violation. Telephone 
interview with Delegate J. Samuel Glasscock, sponsor of the 
seat belt bill (Mar. 30, 1987). 
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mandatory seat belt statute in the future to include the use of 
the seat belt defense. 26 
Jurisdictions Not Recognizing the seat Belt Defense 
The use of the seat belt defense in mitigation of damages has 
encountered a number of obstacles. The most prevalent argument is 
that the seat belt defense for mitigation of damages conflicts 
with a number of traditional tort doctrines. 27 In states 
adhering to the contributory negligence doctrine28 , any negligent 
conduct by the plaintiff will bar all recovery. Most courts find 
this result unjust: "[i]t would be a harsh and unsound rule which 
would deny all recovery to the plaintiff, whose mere failure to 
buckle his belt in no way contributed to the accident, and 
exonerate the active tort-feasor but for whose negligence the 
plaintiff's omission would have been harmless. 1129 Alternatively, 
II [t] 0 admit such evidence of nonuse would permit the jury to 
'compare the damages' which in practical effect might reach almost 
the same result as 'comparative negligence. ,"30 
Allowing evidence of plaintiff's nonuse of an available seat 
belt also runs counter to the traditional notion in tort theory 
that unless put on notice to the contrary, one is not required to 
anticipate another's negligence. 31 The failure to anticipate 
another's negligence is insufficient negligence to provide a bar 
for recovery for injuries. 32 No duty to anticipate another's 
negligence exists in the absence of a statute to the contrary.33 
26There are three possible applications of the seat belt 
defense: (1) negligence per se, (2) contributory negligence, 
and (3) mitigation of damages. The most successful 
application has been the mitigation theory, which will be the 
focus of this article. 
27See Westenberg, supra note 9, at 788. 
28virginia, along with Alabama, the District of Columbia, 
Maryland, North Carolina and South Carolina, has not adopted 
the comparative negligence doctrine. Id. at 836-40. 
29Miller, 273 N.C. at 237, 160 S.E.2d at 73. 
30Britton v. Doehring, 287 Ala. 498, ___ , 242 So. 2d 666, 
675 (1970). See also Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.R.D. 
132, 138 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
31See Nash v. Kamrath, 21 Ariz. App. 530, ,521 P.2d 161, 
163-cI974); Miller 273 N.C. at 234, 180 S.E.2d at 70. 
32Libscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. Super. ct. 
1967) . 
33Roberts v. Bohn, 26 Ohio App. 2d 50, ,269 N.E.2d 53, 
59, rev'd on other grounds 29 Ohio st. 2d 99, 279 N.E.2d 878 
(1971) • 
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The doctrine of avoidable consequences34 also precludes the 
use of the seat belt defense. This theory imposes a duty on the 
plaintiff to minimize damages after the accident has occurred. 
The doctrine of avoidable consequences is not applicable to the 
seat belt defense because the plaintiff's alleged negligent act, 
the failure to fasten the seat belt, occurred before the negligent 
act of the defendant. 35 The seat belt defense simply does not 
fit into the doctrine of avoidable consequences36 and most 
courts are not willing to stretch the doctrine to accommodate the 
seat belt defense. 37 
In a negligence action, traditionally the defendant takes the 
plaintiff as he finds him once injury proximately caused by 
defendant's negligence is introduced. The seat belt defense 
changes this rule by allowing the defendant to modify his 
liability according to whether his innocent victim was wearing a 
seat belt at the time of the action. Courts are reluctant to 
modify this tort theory. 
Another concern of courts in considering the seat belt 
defense on the mitigation of damages issue is jury speculation and 
conjecture. The seat belt defense "would tend to cause rampant 
speculation as to the reduction . in the amount of recoverable 
damages attributable to [a] failure to use available seat 
belts.,,38 Juries grapple with questions similar to the ones 
involved in a seat belt defense when they deal with proximate 
cause and future damages, 
[b]ut at least in such instances, the judgment deals 
with what did in fact happen or what is reasonably 
probable to happen. In the seat belt area, we are 
dealing with what would have happened if the 
seat belt had been used as well as what happened due to 
the failure to use the seat belt.39 
A further problem arises when the jury determines that the 
plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt did aggravate the injuries, 
34Also referred to as the doctrine of mitigation of damages. 
35Britton, 287 Ala. at , 242 So. 2d at 671. 
36Lipscomb, 226 A.2d at~7. 
37The sole exception is New York. Westenberg, supra note 
9/. at n. 13. 
~8Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 396, 517 P.2d 458, 460 
(1974) . 
39Lipscomb, 226 A.2d at 918. 
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but the jury has trouble separating the injuries caused by the 
plaintiff's own negligence. 40 According to the rule of avoidable 
consequences, if the jury cannot make the division, the negligence 
of the plaintiff will bar all recovery.4l When the jury cannot 
make an apportionment of the damages, a harsh conclusion similar 
to contributory negligence results. Courts are not lightly 
dismissing the role of conj ecture and the complexi ty of 
apportionment of damages involved in the seat belt defense. 42 
Lastly, a number of courts have determined that evidence of 
plaintiff's nonuse of a seat belt should not be used to mitigate 
damages if the plaintiff has no statutory or common law duty to 
wear a seat belt. 43 These courts indicate that the proper 
vehicle for adoption of a seat belt defense based on mitigation of 
damages is action by the legislature. "[I]t is apparent that 
acceptance of the seat belt defense can only be justified as a 
deviation from common law negligence on a public" policy theory . 
. The legislature, and not the judiciary, serves as the barometer 
of public policy . ,,44 In states where the legislature has 
spoken against the seat belt defense, the courts recognize that 
the legislature has foreclosed its use. 45 
Jurisdictions Recognizing the Seat Belt Defense 
The jurisdictions which do not permit nonuse of an available 
safety belt to be introduced as evidence in mitigation of damages 
primarily focus on the accident as a single, undivided unit. 46 
The test used by these jurisdictions is whether the accident was 
the proximate cause of the injury.47 If the answer to this 
40Id. at 917. 
4lId. (Dean Prosser's analysis of the rule of avoidable 
consequences) . 
42See Vizzini, 72 F.R.D. at 138; Miller, 273 N.C. at 240, 
l60~E.2d at 74. 
43See , e.g., Nash, 21 Ariz. App. at , 521 P.2d at 163-64. 
44Fischer, 138 Colo. at 396, 517 P.2d at 460; see also 
Miller, 273 N.C. at 238, 160 S.E.2d at 73; Roberts, 26 Ohio 
App. 2d at ___ , 269 N.E.2d at 58; Fields v. Volkswagen of 
America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 62 (Okla. 1976). 
45See Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 520 
(Tenn. 1973). 
46In other words, these courts do not consider the effect of 
a "second collision", Le., the impact which occurs when the 
occupant is thrown against the interior of the motor vehicle. 
This issue is of particular importance in crashworthiness 
cases. 
47Note, Liability for Nonuse of Child Restraints, 70 Iowa 
L. Rev. 945, 951 (1985). 
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question is in the affirmative, the analysis is complete and the 
issue of whether the use of an available seat belt would have 
mitigated the extent of the injury is never raised. 48 
Jurisdictions that do recognize the seat belt defense49 view 
the accident as comprising separable stages, and consider not only 
the initial collision but also the impact that occurs when the 
occupant is thrown against the interior of the automobile. The 
leading case on the mitigation theory is Spier v. Barker. 50 In 
spier, the court decided that because of increased public 
awareness concerning the efficacy of seat belt use in preventing 
traffic injuries and fatalities, the failure of a plaintiff to use 
an available seat belt could be considered unreasonable in some 
circumstances. 51 The court held that nonuse of an available seat 
belt is a factor the jury may consider52 subject to two 
important limitations. First, the mitigation defense is limited 
to the issue of damages, and may not be considered by the jury 
with regard to the question of liability. Second, the defendant 
has the burden of producing competent evidence which demonstrates 
"a causal connection between the plaintiff's nonuse of an 
available seat belt and the injuries and damages sustained. ,,53 
By imposing these limitations, the court took into consideration 
the criticism directed at the seat belt defense, and in essence 
forged a compromise with the opponents of the theory. 
48Id. The use of this test would seldom, if ever result in 
a finding that failure to wear an available seat belt was the 
proximate cause of the injury. 
49See Marema, The Seat Belt Defense - An Update, 28 For the 
Oef. 19, 20 (1986). The following states allow evidence of 
nonuse of an available seat belt to be introduced in 
mitigation of damages: Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvannia, 
Wisconsin, and wyoming. Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, and 
Nebraska also allow mitigation, but limit the amount of 
damages which may be reduced. Florida recognizes the seat 
belt defense as evidence of comparative negligence, while 
California has been willing to view the defense as evidence 
of contributory negligence. 
50 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974). 
51Id. at 450, 323 N.E. 2d at 167. Although the court 
indicated that failure to use an available seat belt could be 
considered unreasonable depending on the circumstances of the 
particular case, it was unwilling to impose seat belt use as 
a standard of reasonable conduct because New York did not 
have a mandatory seat belt law at that time. 
52Id. 
53Id. 
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The primary concern was that adoption of the seat belt 
defense would be tantamount to finding the plaintiff 
contributorily negligent, resulting in a directed verdict for the 
defendant. If this procedure was accepted, the tort-feasor would 
be relieved of liability for his wrong, contrary to the desire of 
the courts to do sUbstantial justice to both parties. This 
objection is eliminated by limiting the defense to the issue of 
damages only, so that the defendant is still answerable on the 
merits of the case. The second concern was the possibility that 
the question of damages would be subjected to open ended 
speculation by jurors, but this problem has not proven 
insurmountable. For the defendant merely to prove that the 
plaintiff failed to wear an available seat belt is insufficient to 
invoke the seat belt defense. The defendant must produce evidence 
competent to satisfy the court's nexus requirement that the 
failure to wear a seatbe1 t directly caused aggravation of the 
plaintiff's injuries. If the estimation of aggravated injuries is 
too speculative, the court will not allow the jury to consider 
mitigation of these damages. 54 Furthermore, a calculation of the 
injuries caused by nonuse can be accurately measured by accident 
reconstruction experts. 55 
A more difficult common law obstacle for the seat belt 
defense to overcome is the doctrine of avoidable consequences. 
According to this theory, a'p1aintiff is under a duty to mitigate 
all damages after an accident occurs which can be avoided. The 
best example of this doctrine is the requirement that the 
plaintiff seek medical attention as soon as possible after an 
accident. If the plaintiff delays in seeking medical attention 
resulting in an exacerbation of his injuries, the defendant is not 
liable for the effect of this delay. The seat belt defense, 
however, does not fit squarely within the perimeters of the 
54This position is consistent with the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 465 (1965). 
55See Annot, 80 A.L.R.3d 1033, 1041 (1977). The defendant's 
attorney can readily procure the services of an expert from 
an undergraduate engineering school. See also Amend v. Bell, 
89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977) (seat belt defense 
rejected on the grounds that it would lead to a battle of 
expert witnesses) . 
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doctrine of avoidable consequences. The doctrine applies only to 
avoidance of post-accident damages, and does not require the 
plaintiff to mitigate damages prior to the accident. Many of the 
jurisdictions which have refused to adopt the seat belt defense 
have done so because of a reluctance to extend the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences to cover mitigation of pre-accident 
damages. According to these jurisdictions, the extension of the 
doctrine would impose a duty on the plaintiff to anticipate the 
negligence of others in direct contradiction to common law 
principle. This doctrine generally has not been applied to 
mitigation of pre-accident damages in the past because it has not 
been technologically feasible for a plaintiff to predict or 
prevent damages before an accident happens. The wide availability 
of seat belts in automobiles prompted the court in Spier to extend 
the doctrine to cover mitigation for nonuse. The court reasoned 
that "the seat belt affords the automobile occupant an unusual and 
ordinarily unavailable means by which he or she may minimize his 
or her damages prior to the accident. ,,56 Motor vehicle studies 
support the court's position that traffic fatalities and injuries 
are reduced by use of safety belts. 57 
The Seat Belt Defense in Virginia: Case Law 
The only case in Virginia that has considered the seat belt 
defense is Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc .. 58 Because this 
was a case of first impression, the district court had to predict 
whether the Virginia courts would adopt the seat belt defense. 
The court decided that in light of existing trends in Virginia 
case law, the courts of this state should adopt the seat belt 
defense. 59 The court imposed the same limitations provided for 
in spier, that is, that mitigation would apply to damages only, 
and must be based upon the production of competent evidence. 60 
In adopting the seat belt defense, the court was faced with the 
56 35 N.Y.2d at 452, 323 N.E.2d at 169. 
57See Richmond Times Dispatch, Feb. 16, 1987, at A-II, col. 
1. It is estimated that use of safety belts would eliminate 
at least 100 of the 1,000 traffic fatalities in virginia each 
year. 
58 445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978). 
59Id. at 1372. 
60Id. 
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problem that Virginia law did not allow nonuse to be considered as 
evidence of negligence. 6l The court stated that the prohibition 
on establishing negligence from nonuse did not prevent a jury from 
considering such nonuse in mitigation of damages. The court 
reasoned that had the General Assembly intended to prevent 
evidence of nonuse from being introduced to mitigate damages, it 
explicitly would have provided for such a proscription. 62 Within 
two years of this decision, the virginia General Assembly 
overruled wilson by amending the seat belt law to include a 
provision that nonuse of a safety belt shall not "be considered in 
mitigation of damages of whatever nature.,,63 The addition of 
this provision foreclosed use of the seat belt defense in civil 
actions, by providing the courts with a clear indication of the 
Assembly's intent that the defense be disallowed. 
Conclusion 
The Virginia General Assembly has taken an important first 
step toward reducing the number of traffic deaths and injuries by 
passing the new mandatory seat belt law. Although the statute 
explicitly prohibits the seat belt defense in civil actions, 
support for the law was divided and exclusion of the defense was 
necessary in order to secure passage of the measure. The seat 
belt defense should be reconsidered for adoption by the Assembly 
in the near future. At the present time, the defendant is liable 
for all the plaintiff's injuries in an automobile accident, 
including those injuries which are in the plaintiff's exclusive 
power to avoid. The equities involved in the seat belt defense 
controversy are difficult to balance, and the defendant should be 
liable, as the principle tort-feasor, for those injuries over 
which the plaintiff has no control. with passage of the new 
mandatory seat belt law, the plaintiff no longer has an excuse for 
failing to buckle up, and the defendant should not be held liable 
this time stated: "Failure to use such 
shall not be deemed to be 
Code Ann. § 46.1-309.1(b) (Repl. Vol. 
61The statute at 
safety lap belts, 
negligence." Va. 
1974) 62 455 F. Supp. at 1373. 
63va. Code Ann. § 46.l-309.l(b) (1986). 
62 
for the plaintiff's failure to do what is now legally required of 
all Virginians. 
correction: in "The Time is Ripe" discussing the need for a small 
- claims court in virginia, Vol 15, #2, p. 42, a citation for Mr. 
Barney's example of a landlord-tenant dispute was ommitted. That 
citation is: Sandra Evans, "Small Claims Rules Confusing in 
Virginia," Washington Post, 9 November 1986, p.1, col. 1. 
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VIRGINIA'S DILEMMA: PRIMARY OR CAUCUS? 
James A. Kline, IV* 
Stephanie Lipinski Molnar** 
Adoption by the 1987 Virginia General Assembly of a non-
binding Presidential primary for 1988 does not resolve which 
delegate selection process, caucus or primary, best represents the 
interests of Virginia voters. Both parties want a democratic 
process of selection, fiscal responsibility, adequate 
representation, and strong party organization. By opening the 
party nomination doors to registered voters, we can expect the 
names on the party ticket to more accurately reflect the choices 
of voters at large. Although seeking popular consensus in 
nominating candidates seems to be the truly democratic approach to 
this crucial election process, the benefit of centralized party 
strength endemic to the mass meeting system is sometimes lost 
amidst the primary. 
Whichever process is used, Virginia remains under the 
strictures of select federal legislation, the Voting Rights Act of 
1965. 1 The Act was originally imposed upon seven states and 
certain counties in three other states2 for poll practices found 
to be discriminatory. NOW, an affected jurisdiction cannot 
permissibly "bailout" of the bonds of the act3 until it obtains 
"preclearance" from either the United states District Court for 
the District of Columbia or the United states Attorney General. 4 
In the past, Republicans and Democrats have used both 
primaries and caucuses in an attempt to control the state 
government and the federal offices from Virginia. In recent 
years the caucus system has been criticized for being 
unrepresentative of virginia's electorate. Is the primary system, 
given its checkered history, really better for Virginia? This 
* Mr. Kline is a second-year student and a member of the Moot 
Court Board at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of 
William and Mary. 
** Ms. Molnar is a first-year student at the Marshall-Wythe School 
of Law, College of William and Mary. 
145 U.S.C. (1973a to bb(l) (1982). 
2S. Rep. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1975 
U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News 774. 
3See 42 U.S.C. {1973b (a) (1982). 
4See 42 U.S.C. {1973c (1982). 
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article presents arguments supporting and opposing the use of the 
primary election in virginia for nominating candidates for public 
office. 
The virginia Primary is an asset to the Virginia electorate. 
The simplest alternative to the mass meeting nomination 
process for political candidates is delegate selection by state 
primary elections. Results of the relatively closed convention 
method often leave voters feeling stripped of the'ir right to vote 
for lack of participation. A political party that does not 
reflect popular sentiment or that restricts itself to maneuvering 
by party "insiders" limits itself to accomplishing something less 
than the desired objective: nominating a candidate who most 
clearly reflects the goals and beliefs of the party and who is 
most likely to implement those views by achieving success in the 
general e1ection. 5 
Following are arguments which bolster the use of primary 
elections rather than candidate selection by mass meetings, and 
why the former are more advantageous to a democratic society. 
Primaries are more open and democratic than mass meetings. 
The nature of party conventions causes introvertedness of the 
party, led by party activists. The chosen few control the 
direction that a party takes in selecting its nominees. Only one 
percent of the Virginia electorate participates in the mass 
meetings. 6 Excluding 99 percent of Virginia's registered 
voters 7 does not maintain an ideal democratic electoral system. 
Additionally, Republicans have charged a fee to participate in the 
mass meetings, 8 a practice which hauntingly resembles the 
unconstitutional poll tax. 9 
The General Assembly's recent adoption of the primary 
nomination system for the 1988 Presidential race will create a 
5Chambers & Rotunda, Reform of Presidential Nominating 
Conventions, 56 Va. L. Rev. 179, 214 (1970). 
6The Virginian-Pilot, April 22, 1985, at C4, col. 2. 
7Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 18, 1985, at Section 0-2, col. 
l. 
8See supra note 6. 
9See U.S. Const. amend. XXIV. 
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party candidate selection process more accessible to rank and file 
party members, while avoiding practices sometimes perpetrated 
during party conventions. 10 The possibility of corruption 
associated with mass meetings is shown by one example that 
tarnished the road to the 1985 governorship. 
The site was the Charlotte County courthouse. l1 The event 
was a caucus to elect delegates and alternates to the 1985 
Virginia state Democratic Convention. Instead of holding a 
convention where interests were united to strengthen the party, 
the meeting evolved into a divisive battle between the Davis and 
Baliles camps. 
The caucus was organized by a Baliles partisan who was in 
fact listed on the ballot as a Baliles candidate for delegate. 
Temporary rules governing the conduct of the meeting were not 
available at least a week in advance of the April 1, 1985 caucus, 
in violation of the virginia Democratic Party Plan. The meeting 
was held in a courthouse with seating capacity of approximately 
175 persons, but almost 300 attended. No access was provided for 
the handicapped. 
Despite the fact that the crowd would exceed capacity became 
apparent about a half an hour before the 7:30 p.m. starting time, 
the chair did not make an effort to secure enough certification 
forms for registering everyone until immediately prior to 7: 30. 
Thus, the meeting began late, and people entered the caucus 
through the courthouse doors that were left open after 7: 30. 
Undermining the requirement to have different size ballots to vote 
for delegates and alternates, duplicate ballots of uniform size 
were copied and distributed. The result was chaos in 
distinguishing the ballots, creating the opportunity for a skewed 
tally through double balloting. 
A feature of the Charlotte caucus was the racial division 
that occurred during the meeting. The chair requested that the 
10See Carr & scott, The Constitutionality of State Primary 
Systems: An Associational Rights Analysis, 10 J. Comtemp. L. 83 
(1985) . 
lISee, testimony concerning Charlotte County Grievance before the 
Temporary Creditials Committee of the State Democratic Party at 
the John Marshall Hotel, April 14, 1985, Richmond, Virginia. 
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crowd physically divide itself into respective camps on opposite 
sides of the room, which resulted in virtual black and white 
division. Peer pressure and public exposure directly influenced 
the participants; intimidation from the chair fueled animosity. 
Order and control were poorly exercised in the distribution 
of the ballots to the crowd. Numerous electors voted for more 
than the apportioned number of candidates for delegates and 
alternates .12 The chair left the location with the ballots and 
certification forms. There was no verification that participants 
in the caucus were registered voters. The result of the 
uncontrolled caucus was the improper election of 9 Baliles 
delegates and 4 Baliles alternates to the 1985 Virginia state 
Democratic Convention. 
If the mass meeting system and its heightened possibility of 
misfeasance were maintained, Virginia might never see the end of a 
political structure unresponsive to popular sentiment and 
generally desired results at the polls. Such a system might never 
stabilize for the five year periodl3 required to release the 
virginia electoral process from the proscriptions of the Voting 
Rights Act. Enacting the primary system for the Presidential 
nomination is a positive step towards opening the availability of 
elected office to the selections of the masses, rather than to 
only the party regulars. 
Party autonomy and the open primary problem of "Crossover". 
A serious problem arises with the General Assembly's adoption of 
the primary because virginia's primary is "open." Open primary 
states do not require voters to register with a particular party 
to exercise their right to vote. l4 This characteristic creates 
the inevitable effect of "crossover," where members of party A 
raid party B' s primary and vote in an attempt to influence the 
outcome, desirably leaving party A with an undue advantage 
relative to party B's result. The objective is to vote for the 
12see , Challenge Before the Temporary Credentials Committee of 
the-r985 virginia Democratic state Convention. 
13See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 332 (1966). 
14See supra note 10, at 84. 
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other party's underdog so that your party's first choice will face 
better odds in the general election should both candidates 
advance. IS Carried to its logical extreme, the result of 
voters participating in another party's primary may be the 
advancement of candidates other than the party's best to contend 
in the general election. This leaves all voters with two second 
choices and no first-choice candidate. Pragmatically, this 
scenario is unlikely. Nonetheless, the results in an open primary 
are not necessarily a reflection of the judgment of the party 
adherents .16 A party could shrink or grow unnaturally, limiting 
its ability to accomplish its political tasks. 17 
virginia is no stranger to elections tainted with crossover. 
In 1978, the Virginia Democratic party abandoned the use of 
primaries after losing control of its nominations when populist 
hopeful Henry Howell defeated Andrew P. Miller for the u.s. senate 
nomination. 18 Crossover was blamed for sparse voter turnout in 
1949 and caused the Republican party to turn to mass meetings as 
an alternative nominating process. 19 
The lack of maj or party membership does not render 
independents any less culpable with respect to crossover. They 
may register with a party in order to influence its primary,20 
sometimes because of mere attraction to a particular candidate. 
Loss of control by a party of its candidate selection is a 
threat to "party autonomy.,,21 In an attempt to preserve the 
structure and cohesiveness of a party, constitutional arguments 
based on a party's claimed right of free association have been 
advanced to limit a state legislature's ability to open its 
primaries to party "outsiders. ,,22 Additionally, a state statute 
forbidding voting in primaries by non-party registrants is an 
1SSince voters are allowed to vote only once in a primary 
election, participating in another party's primary results in a 
trade-off in the power of a vote. 
16See supra note 5, at 182. 
17Id. 
18See supra note 6. 
19Id. 
20Id. 
2Tee supra note 10, at 97. 
22Id. at 100. 
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unconstitutional deprivation of a party's freedom of political 
association rights. 23 
The associational rights claim was used in 1958 when the 
United states Supreme Court recognized that an individual's right 
of association under the First Amendment may be applied to a group 
as a whole when the organization consists of individuals 
supporting a common belief. 24 This rationale was expanded to 
find party autonomy for the National Democratic Party in 1975. 25 
In the same year, the United states Circuit Court for the District 
of Columbia closed the gap in the application of associational 
rights analysis to political parties in holding that a national 
party's selection of a nominee deserves constitutional 
protection. 26 In Ripon, Chief Justice Bazelon declared that the 
rights of speech and assembly would be meaningless without an 
accompanying right of political association. 27 The U.S. Supreme 
Court voiced its opinion on the application of associational 
rights to political parties in 1981 'when it affirmed its position 
in Cousins and held that national parties have a right of 
protection from intrusion by party outsiders, and further noted 
that this rationale supports extending associational rights to 
state political parties "as adherents to national parties."28 In 
sum, parties may freely define their membership requirements under 
the associational rights protection, as long as they are not 
discriminatory. 
In order to preserve party autonomy, some states enacted 
statutes requiring those voters who wish to participate in the 
upcoming election to register with a particular party well in 
advance of the primary election. 29 However, in some cases, these 
23Republican Party of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 107 s. ct. 544 
(1986) • 
24NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
25Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975). 
26See Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 548 
(D.~Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1975). 
27424 U.S. 567, 585 (1975). 
28Democratic Party of United states v. Wisconsin ex. reI. La 
Follette, 450 U.s. 107, 121 (1981), quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 
U.s. 477, 487 (1975). 
29In Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973), the Court found 
a legitimate and valid state interest in preserving the integrity 
of the electoral process by requiring voters to remain with their 
registered party for eleven months before the primary election. 
However, in the same year the Court struck down an Illinois 
69 
requirements are held to be an excessive restriction on one's 
right to vote. 30 The ultimate balance involves the individual's 
right of freedom of association and the party's inverse right of 
autonomy. The controlling factor in the balancing of the 
electoral interests is whether the voter can participate in the 
upcoming primaries if he acts promptly in changing his or her 
party affiliation. 31 
Another objection to parties' self-protection efforts arose 
with the "white primary" cases32 where black voters were 
excluded from the nominating elections. In an unexpected 
variation from the exclusive status political parties seemed to 
have acquired under the party autonomy dispute, the Supreme Court 
found parties to be commissioned with a public responsibility 
that precludes the denial of access to the polls to black 
voters. 33 Thus primaries are not the exclusive province of 
integral private associational organization. 34 
Although the attempt to maintain a "private" party is clearly 
prohibited by smith, this does not render party automony 
lifeless. 35 Discrimination is distinguished from party 
adherence. Therefore parties are faced with the serious dilemma 
of trying to bolster party membership and enthusiasm while 
simultaneously screening out those infiltrators who may eventually 
skew the party's desired outcome. However, this is where the 
interest of the party should become subservient to the voters as 
individuals and let the democractic process run its course. 
Party registration is the means by which a party can most 
effectively avert the danger of crossover. When viewed as 
statute that barred participation in a party's primary election if 
the voter had voted in another party's primary within the 
preceding 23 months, calling the statute an unnecessarily 
excessive restriction on one's right of free association under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments by "locking in" the voter. Kusper 
v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973). The Court distinguished Rosario 
as not being the absolute bar from the polls that Kusper 
presented. 414 U.S. at 61,62. 
30Kusper, 414 U.S. 51 (1973). 
31See supra note 10, at 90. 
32Id. 
33Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
34Comment, The Constitutionality of Non-Member voting in 
Political Party Primary Elections, 14 Williamette L. J. 259 at 276 
(1978) . 
35See supra note 10, at 92. 
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encouraging wide voter participation and supporting developed 
party autonomy, requiring voters to register is not overly 
burdensome. As it stands, the results of the 1988 virginia 
primary will be non-binding without party registration. 36 
Giving party regulars more control by using mass 
meetings/conventions does not make the political 
parties stronger. 
A popular argument supporting the use of mass meetings is 
that the inherent control exercised by party activists makes the 
party stronger. Party "activists" are those individuals devoted 
to serving their respective parties by donating their time and 
effort to attending party caususes and serving as delegates to 
state conventions37 and in recent Virginia history have 
nourished convention life by continuing to serve as delegates to 
subsequent mass meetings. 38 But given the presumed experience 
and established beneficial contacts party regulars acquire, the 
apparent party ·cohesiveness proves to be transparent. For 
example, approximately 40 percent of delegates polled during the 
Democratic state convention held in Richmond in June, 1980, 
responded that they would not actively support the successful 
nominee if their supportee, either Edward Kennedy or Jimmy Carter, 
did not receive the party's nomination. 39 In contrast, an 
average of 10 percent of Republican delegates polled at the GOP 
convention the same month indicated noncommittal if their choice 
did not succeed. 40 
This alienage occured in· recent Virginia gubernatorial 
nominating conventions as well. An intraparty feud in 1985 
between Democratic hopefuls led to accusations of delegate 
stealing, resulting in what the American Civil Liberties Union has 
termed a "debacle" in state nominating procedure. 41 Both the 
Democratic and Republican conventions were blamed for clouding the 
36washington Post, February 20, 1987, at OS, col. 4. 
37Abramowitz, McGlennon & Rapoport, Presidential Activists and 
the Nationalization of Party Politics in Virginia, Contemporary 
Southern Attitudes and Behavior 183 (1982). 
38Id. at 185. 
39Id. at 190. 
40Id. 
41See supra note 7. 
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nominating process and leaving the position of leaders and laggers 
indistinguishable. 
The weakness that tainted the Democratic party in 1980 was 
obvious to its victim and political observers: both the Democratic 
and Republican delegates considered the GOP convention to be the 
most effective. 42 
Primaries are not more costly than mass meetings. 
Perhaps the most revealing method of analyzing the costs of 
conducting conventions and primaries is the dollar-to-vote ratio 
which emerges from the election results. 
Consider the most recent local controversy concerning the 
cost of conventions which arose out of the 1985 gubernatorial 
race. Collectively, the two Democratic nominees and the two 
Republican nominees43 spent over $3 million seeking their 
respective party's candidacy. 44 Be mindful that successful 
candidates had yet to begin spending on the then upcoming general 
election. 45 Baliles I dollar-to-vote ratio, an oft-quoted figure, 
reached well over $400 for each delegate that his campaign sent to 
the Democratic state convention. 46 Davis spent even more for 
fewer delegates. 47 No virginia primary has ever cost more than 
what was spent by the four prospective gubernatorial nominees in 
1985. 48 Opening the nominating process to Virginia voters will 
surely produce a less expensive result. 49 
Candidates nominated by the caucus system represent the interests 
of Virginians. 
42See supra note 37, at 193. 
43The Democratic nominees were Lt. Gov. Richard Davis and 
Attorney General Gerald Baliles. The Republican nominees were 
Wyatt Durette and 8th District Rep. Stanford Parris. 
~4virginian-Pilot, April 6, 1985, at A10, col. 1. 
45Id. 
46Id. See also supra note 7, col. 3. 
47See supra note 44, col. 2. 
48See supra note 6. 
49virginia Senate Majority Leader Hunter B. Andrews (D.-Hamption) 
estimated that the Presidential primary will cost about $1.2 
million and that the legislature would appropriate about $500,000 
to lessen the financial burden on locales. See supra note 36, 
col. 3. 
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The change from a primary candidate selection system to mass 
meeting selection twice in the past is an indication that both 
political parties realized that a primary is synonymous with 
defeat in the general election. Reeling from a disasterous 
primary that split the party, the Democrats have used the caucus 
method to regroup and regain control of the governor's mansion and 
five of the ten Congressional seats. The Republicans have not 
nominated a candidate by any other method than the caucus since 
1949, in a embarassing primary where only 9000 Virginians 
exercised their franchise. 50 
The caucus system has been defended by both parties as the 
selection process that best represents the interests of the party 
and allows a democratic selection of the candidates. They 
present arguments to support this position. 
Caucuses are open and democratic. 
Under the guidelines established by both major parties, the 
selection process of delegates must be published for public 
information. All feasible efforts must be made, regardless of the 
selection process, to allow for full public participation. 51 
Full notice requires timely notice that would allow all registered 
voters to participate on the process even if they previously 
belonged to another party. The 1968 Democratic Convention Call 
and subsequent calls have provided for easily accessible meeting 
places at convienient times. The Virginia Call to Convention for 
1985 required that the rules for the local caucuses be published 
no later than one week in advance, and provided for an appeal 
process for contested rules and delegate election. 52 The 
Republican Party has similar provisions incorporated into its 
Convention Plan. 53 Both plans provide for saturday and evening 
caucuses in an attempt to encourage more participation. While the 
Republicans have charged a fee to be a delegate or a 
50rd. 
51See supra note 5, at 208. 
52 Delegate Selection Plan and Call to Convention for the 1985 
virginia Democratic State Convention, p. 11 [hereinafter cited as 
Convention Plan]. 
53 See supra note 5, at 209. 
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participant, 54 the Democrats charge a fee for delegate 
participation only.55 
Primaries create division within the party making it harder to 
unite for the general election. 
Primaries, with their inherent competitive element, are too 
divisive. 56 The sharp division created between supporters of 
Henry Howell and Andrew Miller in the 1977 Primary was so severe 
that the party organization could not recoup sufficiently to mount 
a viable campaign against John Dalton in the general election. 
The first ballot commitment requirement of the Democratic 
Party rules allows the candidates to assess their positions and 
either concede early and compromise with the future victor, or 
place themselves in a position to trade delegates for concessions 
to positions they represented before the convention, thereby 
unifying the platform and avoiding the possibility for factions. 
Unlike the primary selection method that is over in one day, the 
time spread for the compromise period can be several weeks. 
The candidate in the convention method is selected by a 
majority, subject to a provisio for elimination on each ballot so 
that the eventual candidate is a majority choice and reflective of 
the delegates' consensus. It is possible in a state that doesn't 
have a run-off provision to have a candidate that received only 
21% of the vote to be the nominee of the party. 
Giving the party regulars control of the caucus/convention 
process makes the party stronger. 
Making the party stronger does not mean that the party 
regulars necessarily support a specific party leader, but that 
they support the party itself. Although the leadership reflects 
the party program, changes in the program direction often come 
from the support of the regulars. At the June 1985 Republican and 
Democrat conventions in Richmond, 76% of the Democrats and 74% of 
the Republicans responded that party support was a very important 
54See supra note 6. 
55Convention Plan at p. 5. 
56Washington Post, April 13, 1978 at Section Va-I, col. 1. 
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factor in their attendance. 57 The strength of a party rests in 
its ability to elect candidates. since the return of the 
Democrats to the Caucus system in 1981, they have won the last two 
gubernatorial elections and half of the Congresiona1 seats. The 
caucus system allowed the party to regroup by providing a list of 
party activists that are willing to identify themselves as members 
of the party and who are willing to donate time, influence, and 
money to get candidates e1ected. 58 
The caucus system best utilizes limited financial resources. 
Limited financial resources have not played as critical a 
role to the Republican Party as they have in the Democratic 
Party I S decision to change to the caucus system. The Republican 
Party has always been a more effective fundraising organization 
than the Democratic Party. 59 Utilization of modern mail and 
computer based fundraising techniques have given the Republicans a 
financial edge in the past, thus relieving them of the necessity 
of having to save funds as an excuse to return to primaries. 
Facing a limited pool of resources, the Democrats must use the 
process that requires the least expenditure. 
In the Democratic Primary of 1977 for the governor I s seat, 
Andrew P. Miller and Henry Howell spent a combined $1. 5 million 
do11ars. 60 This averages out to $2.84 per primary voter in 1977 
dollars compared to the average $400 61 per delegate spent by 
Ba1i1es and Davis in the 1985 Democratic Convention process. 62. 
The average total is only $1.4 million, compared to $1.5 million 
in the 1977 Democratic primary.63 
57See supra note 37, at 183. 
58we1kin, Democrat v. Democrat 102 (1984). 
59ware,The Breakdown of Democratic party Organization, 1940-
1980 251 (1985). 
-OUWashington Post, March 18, 1977, at C-1, col. 6. 
61see supra note 7. 
62 Attorney General Gerald Ba1i1es and Lt. Gov. Richard J. Davis 
were candidates for the Democratic nomination. 
63Figures for the last Republican primary, held in 1949, were not 
available. 
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Conclusion 
The use of the primary system for nominating candidates for 
public office can be deferential to the desires of the virginia 
electorate and possibly detrimental to party strength. Choosing a 
primary over a mass meeting involves balancing competing interests 
at various points in history, hence the periodic change in 
selection process in Virginia. 
Because the switch back to the primary for Virginia is non-
binding, it will not give registered voters at large a stronger 
voice in the 1988 Presidential race. The implementation of the 
system achieves only half the objective of conducting a "truly 
democratic election." A caucus still will be required for actual 
selection of delegates to nominate Presidential candidates. Not 
until the virginia electorate is required to register with a 
political party to avoid crossover will the primary work 
successfully. This preventive measure safeguarding the integrity 
of the primary is a reasonable compromise between maintaining 
party strength and giving voters more power in the election. In 
the meantime, the caucus is the determinative method of delegate 
selection. 
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EDUCAT·ION IN VIRGINIA: SOLVING 'CULTURAL DIVISION 
BY THE PROMOTION OF UNDERSTANDING 
*J. Thompson Cravens 
A black youth is struck and killed by an auto as he attempts to 
cross a busy highway in an effort to escape a gang of white hoodlums 
who were attacking him and his friends. l A young black cadet at a 
military academy is hazed and threatened by white cadets, wearing white 
sheets and masks. Under threat, and unprotected by vasilating univer-
sity officials, the cadet withdraws from school. 2 On a television news 
program, high school students tell a reporter that they had never 
spoken to a black "in person". They further t-ell the reporter that 
they would be "afraid" to do so.3 Ironically, the city in which these 
students reside has a quite substantial black population. At a 
prestigious university, students angered by the outcome of an athletic 
event seen on television attack a group of black students, leaving one 
black student seriously injured. 4 Civil Rights marchers in an all 
white locality are attacked and racial tensions are incensed when 
demonstrators along the march route, wearing white sheets and hats, 
throw rocks, bottles, and mud at marchers. 5 
Our nation today is slowly sliding backward, sinking once again 
into the mire and stench of racial oppression. Americans proclaim that 
no master race exists, yet these events did not occur in Pretoria, Cape 
Town or Johannesburg, South Africa. These abominable pursuits, the 
acts of fear, hatred, misunderstanding, and cruelty wrought by orie man 
on another, occurred here, in the United States. One can only wonder 
if those Klansmen and "white rights· protestors in Georgia were the 
same drought stricken southern farmers who a few months ago needed 
*Mr. Cravens is a third year law student at Marshall-Wythe, Sr. Editor 
of the Colonial Lawyer, and a member of the William and Mary National 
Moot Court Team. He is currently writing a book about the civil rights 
movement to be titled: FROM MONTGOMERY WITH A DREAM: Reawakening the 
Conscious of a Nation. 
1 Howard Beach, New York, December 20, 1986. Twenty 
three year old Michael Griffith, after being beaten and chased by 
baseball bat wielding youths, crawled through a fence and onto 
Shore Parkway where in his attempt to escape his attackers he was 
killed by an auto. 
2 The Citadel in South Carolina, Fall Semester 1986. 
3 Television Interview, CBS 60 Minutes, Lansing, Michigan. 
Aired Fall 1986. 
4 October 1986 - University of Massachusetts at Amherst. A 
fight erupted after the New York Mets won the World Series 
against the Boston Red Sox. 
5 Ku Klux Klan members attacked civil rights marchers in 
January 1987 in Forsythe Co., Georgia. 
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feed for their livestock? Were these the same farmers who thanked the 
colorless heroes who grew, packed, and transported hay to their arid 
fields? In an era when Americans are allegedly returning to the church 
and the temple as no time since the fifties,6 this apparent rebirth of 
morality has not transcended racial or cultural barriers. One wonders 
what book is being studied, what morality is being taught. How ironic 
that on the eve of the two-hundreth anniversary of our Constitution, we 
as a people still have not come to terms with the racial and moral 
issues that have plagued this nation since inception. The tragedy is 
that Americans have chosen not to resolve the issues debated at 
Independence Hall prior to the signing of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence in 1776. 
When General George Washington stood on the shores of the York 
River in Yorktown, Virginia in October of 1781, he watched British 
ships laden with a defeated army sail into the Chesapeake Bay bound for 
England. He must have realized that it was the destiny of this great 
land to bear a free and- independent people. It was unfitting, however, 
that that freedom would be restricted to certain classes of white 
males. Ironically, the first bloodshed in the struggle for American 
independence was that of a black man, Crispus Attucks,7 yet his people 
would remain enslaved in America for almost a century beyond the 
revolution. It would be another century after the signing of the 
Emancipation Proclamation before blacks in America could exercise the 
"inalienable rights" spoken of in 1776. It is time today for someone 
to say: No, we refuse to travel down that road again. We have been 
down that road - that road is darkness. It is time that everyone 
realized - socially, ethically, and morally, that people cannot be 
condemned because of social status or race. Herein lies a difficulty 
for both black and white alike. In many ways, the past we speak of is 
too recent to be forgotten. In many other instances, injustice has 
never abated. 
The history books of today teach our children, if at all, but a 
small portion of the black struggle in America, especially during the 
civil rights era. Only a few short months ago America celebrated the 
birthday of one of its finest, the late Reverend Doctor Martin Luther 
King, Jr. This gesture was a glimmering ray of hope and a firm 
reminder to all that things have changed. America has made inroads to 
end legal segregation; but segregation in the mind and segregation in 
the hear can never be ended by statute. Some have chosen to continue 
practicing their prejudicial beliefs. The reason is surely ignorance. 
We as a society must begin to educate, and end this misunderstanding. 
Many political leaders speak of that noble movement of the 1950s 
6 See Americans Return to Church and Temple: u.S. News and 
World Report, Dec. 24, 1986!Jan. 5, 1987 at 40. 
7 Crispus Attucks and four other men were shot dead on 
March 5, 1770 in the streets of Boston, Massachusetts. He and 
his fellow citizens were victims of what has become known as the 
"Boston Masacre". 
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and 1960s not as the dawn of a new day in America, but as a time of 
turbulence and unrest. That movement has far too often been recorded 
in our history books and by the press as a physical reality rather than 
a moral awakening. The reason for this may lie in the fact that our 
society refuses to confess wrong. We refuse to tell our children and 
ourselves that our behavior and that of our parents and grandparents 
before us was ethically and morally contemptable. Events of the 
present demonstrate the need to begin recording, teaching, and remem-
bering those years as the era when America changed course and for 
once made the morally correct decision. The humble ideals which forced 
a poor black woman to refuse to give up her seat on a bus and created a 
nonviolent revolution must be remembered today as vividly as those 
ideals were lived just a few short years ago. Those dreams can sustain 
us today and take us into the future. To do so, however, those words, 
those dreams, must be recorded in the history books and roll from the 
lips of educators. 
Virginia has never been immune from racial conflict; one need only 
read of the current troubles in Colonial Heights, Virginia to discern 
that the civil rights issue is not dead in this state. The pivotal 
question is what can be done today to foster racial understanding and 
promote harmony among people. Virginia has always resided at the 
forefront of national politics, and it is only fitting that this state 
propose specific programs to aid in the struggle against racism and 
prejudice. 
The key to ending prejudice is both understanding and a relaxation 
of tension that exists between many. The difficult task is in deter-
mining what types of programs can be undertaken to promote cultural 
understanding. Though many avenues exist, one area of concentration 
could prove the most beneficial. If we concentrate on our youth, if we 
fashion the textbooks that they read and provide opportunities for 
meaningful social interaction between races, classes, and cultures, 
substantial progress could be achieved. 
One program that could prove mutually beneficial to all is a 
statewide student exchange program concentrating and operating pre-
dominantly with middle school aged children. 8 For years many school 
systems have participated in exchange student programs with students 
from foreign countries coming to America and American students going 
abroad. The student lives with a family and attends an area school. 
It provides the student and the participating family an intensive and 
realistic opportunity to interact and learn to relate with and trust 
one another. The program could be conducted at the state level 
providing urban, rural, black, white, lower, middle, and upper class 
Virginians the opportunity to view themselves and society from a new 
and differing perspective fostering a new respect for those who live in 
8 These are children generally in the 6th, 7th or 8th 
grades ranging generally in age from eleven to fourteen. 
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an environment different than one's own. 9 
If a program such as this, so simple yet so practical, could be 
begun, the initial costs would be offset by the vast potential social 
gain. The program could be conducted virtually cost-free. School 
systems could, each term, interview and select volunteer candidates for 
the exchange program, and families willing to open their homes to an 
exchange student could be enrolled. A student would then enter the 
public school system in the area visited. The family of the student 
would provide transportation costs and normal allowance for the child. 
The host family would provide, at their own expense, housing, food and 
entertainment. School activities in which the student participates 
that require a fee would be paid by the students' parents. The state 
could earmark special funds for administrative costs and funds for 
program participants whose families cannot afford the initial transpor-
tation cost. Though this brief description of the financial arrange-
ment is not exhaustive, it is apparent that cost would not be a 
critical factor. The student exchange could be done for an 8 or 9 week 
term or for an entire semester. The opportunities provided these 
students would likely prove a rare educational experience and the 
benefits to society would be lasting. 
Conclusion 
Our nation has arrived at a point in time where, as Doctor King 
said: Rwe must either learn to live together or die of our ignorance. R 
A statewide student exchange program would allow students to take a 
meaningful step toward the goal of social harmony. There is something 
to be said for the age old idea of Rwalking a mile in another's 
moccasins R• There are those who may oppose this idea as unnecessary or 
unwarranted. One may only ask, however, is deeper understanding ever 
unwarranted? If man has the ability to send rockets into space and 
communicate via satellite with the far reaches of our world, should we 
not allow our children the opportunity to interact and develop ties 
with those in their own state from different socioeconomic back-
grounds? It is time to step forward and be counted. The struggle 
today is not so much equality or voting rights as it is understanding 
and empathy. This program could provide our state and the nation with 
a new generation of Virginians who comprehend the vast cultural 
divergence existing within the state/nation and will seek to utilize 
those differences to create a more positive society rather than 
excluding from their world those different from themselves whose 
lifestyles and ideas are not familiar to them. 
9 Students from Rural areas would be sent to Urban areas, 
urban students to rural school systems. Black students would be 
sent to predominantly white school systems and white students to 
predominantly black school systems. The attempt would be to 
place the student in an environment dissimilar to his/her own: 
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